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'Ptep^ ce 
P R E F A C E 
No institution can survive without adequate financing. Finance is 
the lifeblood of any organization. It is necessary for the day-to-day 
functioning of an institution, for carrying out the operations and activities 
entrusted to it and for planning its future on an assured basis. In reality, 
the very survival of an institution depends upon its financial support and 
stability. Like all other institutions, the UN also depends upon adequate 
and timely flow of resources to its coffer for its survival. Financing is the 
very core of the struggle for the future of the UN. The kind of the UN 
we are going to have at the turn of the century will very much depend 
upon what magnitude and quality of resources we will be able to mobilize 
for the Organization. 
The serious financial crisis of the UN is due to differences of 
opinion concerning the proper role and scope of the Organization, 
particularly with respect to the maintenance of international peace and 
Security. This study attempts to analyse the divergent views of its members 
on financial problem. It also studies the problem in the light of the 
different political perspectixes. 
This study incorporates development upto 1980s. The costs of 
membership, budgetary procedures, and financing peace and security 
operations (such as UN Emergency Force in the Middle East and the UN 
Congo Force) have been discussed in detailed. It also briefly discusses the 
historical precedents and comparative experience of other international 
organizations. 
This dissertation consists of four chapters. In the first chapter a 
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brief history of finance of the past and present international organizations 
have been discussed. It also discusses their historical relevance for the 
UN. What were the financing patterns of the public international unions 
and of the League of Nations? Where the League learnt much from the 
financial experience of the public international unions? To what extent the 
farmers of the UN Charter, learnt from the experience of the League and 
its predecessor? How have the most prominent regional organizations been 
financed? How relevant are their problems to those faced by the UN? Have 
the regional organizations devised any new technique that might be 
meaningful for the UN? Does the fiscal patterns of the major regional 
organizations have any relevance for understanding of the financial crisis 
of the UN? This chapter attempts to explore answers to these questions. 
In the second chapter, budget appropriations and assessment of the 
UN system has been essayed. How have the financial provisions of the 
Charter worked out in practice? Where from the UN funds have come and' 
how have they been spent? What are the main problems that have arisen 
in financing the various activities of the UN? Such questions are of great 
interest to the people of the world. These and other such questions have 
been examined in this chapter. 
Chapter third deals with the financing of peace and Security 
Operations such as the UN Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Middle East 
and the UN Operation in Congo (ONUC). The establishment of UNEF 
in 1956 is a development of remarkable nature as the General Assembly 
for the first time assessed the costs of a major peace-keeping operation on 
the entire membership. It represented a fiscal milestone in the life of the 
UN that deserves close analysis. So does the financing of ONUC which 
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turned the UN into a house divided and brought it to the brinic of 
bankruptcy. It also reviews the Advisory Opinion of the International Court 
of Justice on expenses of UN concerning peace-keeping afid its impact on 
the financial structure of the UN. The legal role of the General Assembly 
in the field of peace and security operation, the nature of Assembly's fiscal 
powers and the role of the Court itself in interpreting the Charter have 
been analysed. The main thrust of our analysis is on UNEF and ONUC. 
Chapter fourth briefly analyses the financial crisis of 1980s which has 
threatened its very viability and solvency of the UN system. The last 
chapter briefly provides an assessment and conclusions. 
In addition to the standard work available, all the relevant original 
source materials have been consulted for preparing this study. If an\ aspect 
relating to the topic is not adequately dealt with, it is primarily due to 
non-availability of certain documents. 
^^e^E^er - / 
FINANCING INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: 
HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
The 20th century witnessed the two World Wars. After the first 
World War the League of Nations was established in 1920, with the 
objective of maintaining international peace and security in the world. But 
ihe League totally failed to achieve its objectives and the second World 
War took place. The second World War compelled the nations of the world 
to endeavour to establish an international organization, so that mutual 
disputes could be resolved peacefully and that peace and security could be 
established in the world. Consequently, even when War was going on the 
great Powers of the world started making their efforts in this direction. 
Their uniting efforts led to the holding of San Francisco Conference at San 
Francisco on 24th June 1945. where the Charter of the United Nations was 
signed and adopted by the 51 nations. The Organization officially came 
into existence on 24 October, 1945, when the Charter has been ratified by 
China, France, erstwhile Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United 
States (the five permanent members of the Security Council), and b\ a 
majority of the other 46 nations, which had signed it'. 
Before analysing the UN budgetary system, it is essential to discuss 
briefly the historical precedents and comparative experience of international 
organizations. First, what were the financing patterns of the public 
international unions and of the League of Nations? The League learnt 
much from the financial experience of the public international unions and 
the farmers of the UN Chartor, in turn relied heavily on the League for 
1- Everyone's United Nations. 10th edn., (New York, 1986). P.3. 
clues to the effective operation of the UN. Here we will also see what 
lessons were and were not learnt from the past. Second, how have the 
most prominent regional organizations been financed? How rele\ent are 
their problems to those faced by the UN. Have the regional organizations 
devised any new technique that might be meaningful ' ' for the UN:' An 
analysis of the fiscal patterns of the major regional organizations may 
provide us with a better understanding not only of the financial crisis of 
the UN but also the manner in which it may be overcome. 
The Public International Unions: 
The problem of financing international organizations arose first in 
the so-called 'public international unions' set up in the nineteenth century. 
These were such bodies as the Universal Postal Union (UPU). established 
in 1874. International Telegraphic Union (ITU), in 1865. and the 
International Telecommunication (IT) and other bodies concerned with 
health, narcotic drug, patent, agriculture, railroad, prison conditions. 
standard of weight and measurement, patents and copyright-. Many of 
them exist to this day and two of them ITU and the UPU sur\ ive as 
Specialized Agencies in the UN system. The Unions were established by 
treaty and were open to all countries\ The process of assessment was 
then, relatively primitive. In most, the responsibility for assessing and for 
collecting was placed on a particular supervising government, usually the 
host government. The costs were relatively small and were raised through 
various forms of assessment. For example, the UPU adopted the seven-
2. John G. Stoeesinger, Financing the United Nations Svstem. (Washington 
D.C., 1964), P.35. 
3. Ibid, PP. 35-36. 
grade system in which the members of the Union were devided into seven 
classes based on population, extent of territory and importance of postal 
traffic. Each member was assessed a certain number of units appropriate 
to its class, but was given the opportunity to join a higher categor\. When 
the annual budget of the Postal Union had been calculated, it was divided 
by the total number of units, and each member state was then appropriateh 
charged. This seven-grade system initially adopted by the League, but was 
abandoned by it in 1924. It still survives in UPU. 
Another type of assessment was adopted by the Railwa\ Union 
which allotted budgetary units in proportion to the mileage of railroads 
operated for international purposes in the member countries. Because the 
total costs to be allocated were very small, governments usually made little 
difficulty about payment, but the demands of national sovereigni\ had the 
effect that government usually had to agree to be allocated to a particular 
category of contributions. The supervising government would help in this 
assessment, and was also responsible for the entire-management of the 
finances of the Union. The Swiss government for example, took charge of 
the funds of the UPU, and ITU, supervised their expenditure, proposed a 
budget and made advances of funds when necessary. 
These early Unions were pioneers in the process of international 
organizations. Their financing patterns and methods of cost sharing 
influenced the drafting of the League Covenant and UN Charter. 
The League of Nations: 
When the League was founded, very little thought was given at first 
to its financial arrangements. Initially it adopted the same pattern of seven-
grade system used by ihe UPU. However, in 1924, new system 'based upon 
capacity to pay' was agreed upon, one authority defines it as the result 
of subtracting the product of population and minimum per capita 
subsistence from the members gross national income ^ 
Even after the Assembly was given fiscal authority and new scale 
of contributions was determined, the League budget remained the most 
economical in the world \ However, the system led to frequent disputes, 
and arrears were normal. There was no provision for suspension of voting 
rights or expulsion for a country in arrears, so there was little incentive 
to pay up. The League, as a result, found itself in perpetual financial 
difficulty, intensified by the same national distrust and the obsession with 
national sovereignty, which created so many political difficulties for the 
Organization. 
The total expenses of the League was very small. Its average budget, 
including all its social and economic activities , the ILO and the Permanent 
Court of International Justice together, was only a little over $10 millions 
a year^. Government made as much difficulty about agreeing the budget as 
if it had been a hundred times as large. The result was perpetual state of 
financial crisis. The economic and social programmes were affected due 
to lack of funds. At times officials of the Secretariat had to offer voluntary 
cuts in salary. The ILO was occasionally unable to even to pay for the 
publication of its reports \ 
4. Ibid., P.39. 
5. David J. Singer, Financing of the League of Nations , International 
Organization. (Boston. New York), Vol.12, N.2, 1959, P.264. 
6. Stoessinger, n.2. P.38. 
7. Ibid, P. 41. 
The League also had difficulty in establishing a satisfactory system 
of financial control. During the early years there was a perpetual struggle 
between the Council and the Assembly to exercise controf. The Assembly 
felt that since every new state had to contribute to the budget, all should 
have a share in formulating it. In other words, it demanded no taxation 
without representation. Eventually in 1924, the League Covenant was 
amended to give the Assembly sole authority to control and apportion 
expenses. The system for examining the budget emerged from the 
Noblemaire report of 1920.** A budget first had to be agreed between the 
treasurer and the Secretary-General, it was then scrutinised carefully by a 
supervisory committee, passed with the comments of the supervisory 
committee to member government, then to the Assembly's fourth 
Committee, and finally to the Assembly itself. Almost exactly the same 
procedure of scrutinies were later adopted by the UN. Because CMI such 
questions the unanimity rule of the League could have proved pariicularly 
harmful^. 
When the UN was established it continued with League system of 
financing. The UN also made the Assembly responsible for voting the 
budget and supervising expenditure. It also established a Special Committee 
of the Assembly, the Fifth Conunittee to be responsible for such matters. 
It also set up an expert body comparable to the old supervisory committee 
called the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions 
(ACABQ). 
In one aspect, the UN learnt an important lesson from the League 
8. Evan Luard, The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does 
(London, 1979) PP. 113-136. 
9. Stoessinger, n. 2, PP. 37-41. 
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experience. The difficulty the League had over arrears arose partly because 
of the lack of sanctions against defaulters. The founders of the UN decided 
to establish a strict system. It was provided in Article 19 of the Charter 
that a member in arrears shall have no vote in the General Assembly if 
the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contribution 
due from it for the preceeding two years'. This wording seemed to imply 
that the loss of vote is automatic, and would be applied without any 
specific decision, (though during the UN's financing crisis in 1962-65. the 
erstwhile Soviet Union claimed that a vote was required, and that a two-
thirds majority would be needed to carry the suspension). Thus onl\ a \ote 
in the Assembly is lost by non payment of dues, but members could 
continue to vote indefinitely in the Security Council, ECOSOC. the 
functional commissions and numerous other forums where votes are more 
significant even when they had failed to pay their dues for man\ \ears'" 
The framers of the UN Charter learnt some important lessons from 
the League's unhappy history. First the budgetary process became much 
more sensible. Fiscal authority was placed in one organ, the General 
Assembly, and struggle for power within the Organization was axoided. 
financial questions no longer required a unanimous vote but couid be 
passed by a two- thirds majority, a provision for sanctions against the 
deliquents was written into the Charter." 
In matters of peace-keeping, the League principle of immediate 
benefit has been followed in only two UN operations, that is UN 
Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in New Guinea in 1962, and the 
lO.Seynour Jacklin, The Financing of the League . Internationa) Affairs 
(London) Vol.9, n. 3. 1932, P.609. 
U.Stoessinger, n.2, PP.39-40 
UN Observer Group in Yemen in 1963. In the first instance, Holland and 
Indonesia divided the cost between them without any expense to the UN, 
and in the second Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic shared the 
cost. Except these two, all other UN peace-keeping operations have been 
based on the principle of collective responsibility. 
The builders of the UN system also departed from precedent in the 
matters of economics, social, and cultural co-operation. They either created 
autonomous Specialized Agencies or set up special voluntary programme 
for the purpose.'-
On the whole, the founders at San Francisco and their successors 
learnt their lessons well from their predecessors at Versailles and Geneva. 
The financial basis of the UN was built more securely in almost e\ ery way. 
The resources of the UN system are much greater than those of the 
League. It is true that the serious financial crisis that has shaken the very 
foundations of the UN is to grow as an instrument of peace and security 
and general welfare. But it is equally true that the UN has been far better 
off financially than was its prodecessor. 
Financing Regional Organizations: 
In this section, we will examine the fiscal patterns of the three types 
of regional organizations. First the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the Council of Europe, whose purpose are primarily political, second 
the experiments in economic integration in western Europe. The hope that 
economic co-operation might contribute to the building of political 
communities, has led to the establishment of several Organizations. These 
12. Ibid.. P.41. 
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arrangements include the organization for European Economic Co-operation 
(OEEC) superseded in 1961 by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM), and the European Economic Community or Common Market 
(EEC), renamed as European Union by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. and 
finally the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
The fiscal pattern of the OAS most closely resembles that of the 
UN. In the western Hemisphere OAS undertakes many of the tasks and 
responsibilities performed by the UN on a global scale. The OAS regular 
budget is approved by a two-thirds majority in the OAS Council like the 
UN regular budget it has increased gradually over the years. In the initial 
figure in 1962-63 of less than $13.2 million to $700 million in the 1990s.'^ 
The basic cause of increasing costs is expanding programmes. This budget 
covered the expenses of the Pan-American Union's technical and 
administrative offices, those of the Secretariats, and the programmes of the 
Inter-American Defence Board, the Inter-American Commission of women, 
the Inter-American Statistical Institute, the Inter-American Judicial 
Committee, and the Committee on Cultural Action. There is also a 
provision for a modest Working Capital Fund. 
The OAS Council also determines the system of apportionment, 
based on 'capacity to pay', which is similar to the current UN scale of 
contributions, with a maximum set at 66 percent of the total. Under the 
system United States paid maximum amounts.'" 
13. The Europa World Year Rook. (England, 1995), Vol.1, P.206. 
14. Stoessinger, n.2, P.44. 
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The budget process of the OAS again resembles that of the UN 
regular budget. The OAS Finance Committee is similar to the UN Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. 
The OAS had engagedin minor peace-keeping operations of the 
Observer type. The peace-keeping expenses of the OAS have always 
remained extremely small which have been paid out of regular budgets, 
have included the use of commissions, military observers, the sealing of 
borders, and the creation of neutral zones. 
Like the UN, the OAS also engages in economic and social acti\ ities. 
Most of the technical assistance work is supported by voluntary 
contributions. There are several technical bodies which are similar to the 
UN Specialized Agencies that are not included under the regular budget 
and obtain their income from a combination of assessment and voluntary 
contributions.'^ 
Arrears constantly plagued the OAS. These have been more serious 
than in the UN regular budget. Unlike UN, there is no provision in the 
OAS Charter against the deliquent states. These shortfalls have had serious 
effect on planning and have made the most extreme economy in the 
Organization's programme planning. So, financing the OAS is in most way 
much smaller scale than, financing the UN. The regular budget of OAS 
is assessed. The criteria that are used to apportion expenses among 
members are similar to those used by the UN. The budget is carefully 
scrutinised. Like all other international organizations, the OAS has faced 
the similar problem, that is lack of resources and the problem of arrears, 
which has threatened its existence. 
15. The Europa World Year Book. n.l3, PP.204-206. 
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The Council of Europe, which was founded in 1949, derives most 
of its revenue by apportioning its expenses among the member states. Each 
country bears the expenses of its representative in the Committee of 
Ministers and in the Consultative Assembly, but the costs of the Secretariat 
and all other common expenses are shared in proportions determined by 
the ministers on the basis of the populations and national income of 
member states. The budget of the Council of Europe are paid without any 
difficulty, and there is no provision of sanctions in the statute of the 
Council.'^ 
The control of budget is shared by the Committee of Ministers and 
the Assembly. The Committee of Ministers has the right to approve the 
budget estimates and the Assembly has right to express its views on the 
budget prior to the Minister's approval. The lack of clear distinction 
between the Committee of Ministers and Assembly reminds the earls days 
of the League of Nations. 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was set 
up in 1948, superseded in 1961 by the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The general expenses of the 
Organization approved unanhnously each year by the Council of Ministers 
and apportioned according to a scale fixed by it. A very rare fiscal practice 
in contemporary international organization. It was also the CounciPs task 
to decide on each member's assessments and to request the Secretary 
General to present it with a supplementary budget if circumstances should 
so require. A resolution involving additional expenditures deemed effective 
until the Council of Ministers had approved an estimate prepared by the 
16. Ibid., P. 137. 
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Secretary General.''' 
When in 1961 the OEEC was remodeled as the OECD with Canada 
and the US as full member, the objective and administrative arrangements 
of the new institution remained similar but the fiscal matters underway a 
minor change. Though the general expenses of the Organization were still 
to be approved unanimously by the Council of Ministers and apportioned 
according to a scale fixed by it, but other expenses shall be financed on 
such basis as the Council may decide . Two-thrids of which was used for 
administrative costs and the remainder apportioned for the outlays of OEEC 
Specialized Agencies. Criteria for distinguishing between general expenses 
and other expenditures were not established.'^ 
The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded in 
1952. It represents a something new in the financing of international 
institution. The High Authority, an organ of ECSC, has the power to tax 
enterprises within the six member states, and it also has the power to 
borrow. The levies it may impose on the enterprises subject to its 
jurisdiction are assessed annually and are calculated according to the value 
of the coal and steel production in the member countries. Paid to the 
ECSC each month, the levy may not exceed a rate of one percent of the 
average value of the enterprise's production, unless the Council of Ministers 
decides to authorize an increase in the quota. Arrears in tax payment are 
very rare. The High Authority charges 5 percent interest on each three 
month delay. Under the Treaty, tax income is used to cover the 
administrative costs of the ECSC, assistance to workers, research and the 
17. Stoessinger, n.2, P.48. 
18. The Europa World Year Rook, n.l3, P.194. 
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establishment of a guarantee found to meet possible delays or default in 
loan repayments. 
The second major source of its revenue is borrowed funds, which 
is also of primary importance. Revenues obtained from borrowing may be 
used by the High Authority only to grant loan to enterprises or to guarantee 
other loans negotiated by these industries. With the unanimous consent of 
the Council of Ministers, they may also be used to help finance workers' 
houses and installations.''' 
The European Economic Community (EEC) or Common Market 
was established in 1958. It was formally renamed as the European Union 
(EU) by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (effective from 1 November 1993), 
although in practice the term EC had been used for several years to 
describe the three communities together. The new Treaty established a 
EU.- '^ 
The EU has two budgets. One pertains to the general budget and 
other to the cost of the social fund. The purpose of the fund is the 
promotion within the community of employment opportunities and of 
workers' mobility, both geographic and occupational. Expenditure under 
the social cost is financed by 'Contribution' assessed on the members by 
the Council of Ministers. 
Whereas the expenditure under the general budget of EU (pertains 
the expenditures of the five main community institutions) is financed by 
"own resources', comprising agriculture levies (on imports of agricultural 
produce from non-member states), customs duties, application of value-
19. Stoessinger, n.2, PP.49-51. 
20. The Europa World Yearbook. n . l3 , p.l43. 
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added tax (VAT) on goods and services, and since (1988) a levy based on 
the GNP of member states. Member states are obliged to collect 'own 
resources' on the community's behalf. In 1988 it was decided by the 
community's heads of government that from (1992) the maximum amount 
of "own resources' was to be equivalent to 1.2% of member states total 
GNP.-' 
In December 1993 ceiling on community expenditure was increased 
to 1.27% of the EUs combined GNP by the 1997 . In December 1994. 
taking into account the enlargement of the EU to 15 countries (from 1 
January 1995) it was agreed to set a level of maximum expenditure ot ECU 
(European Currency Units) 80, 900 million in 1995, increasing to ECU 
92. 400 million in 1999." 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military alliance 
based on the principle of collective self defence. It was established in 1949 
as a result of North Atlantic Treaty as a defensive political and military 
alliance of a group of European states. The financing of NATO is 
accomplished in three basic ways. First by furnishing manpower, which 
remains essentially a national responsibility. Although NATO has now 
established multinational forces under a unified command, but raising and 
maintaining those forces remain under national authority. Moreover, each 
state retains complete autonomy over its defence budget. Second the civilian 
administrative costs of the alliance are apportioned under an agreed scale 
of contributions. So are the expenses of NATO's common infrastructure 
programme. The overall annual costs, exclusive of defense is more than 
21. Ibid., P. 144. 
22. Ibid. 
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$1500 million." For raising of manpower, each year the resources of each 
member state are evaluated in terms of what it can contribute and what is 
reasonable for NATO to ask from it. There is no given formula for this 
procedure, which is called their Annual Review.-'' 
Lessons for the United Nations: 
The lesson which contemporary regional organizations seem to offer 
for the financing of the UN system is the following: an organization 
blessed with a high degree of political consensus and well defined goals 
offering concrete advantages to the membership will have few grave 
problems in the financial matter. 
But because of the absence of such consensus or clearly stated goals 
the Organization is bound to face with financial problems. 
The OAS has not been blessed with a system of common values. The 
United States and the Latin American nations have tended to view the 
organization in a very different light and with very different expectations. 
Hemispheric Solidarity is still an aspiration rather than a reality. The 
financial history of the OAS has been a model for the League of Nations. 
The tiny budget, the problem of arrears, are the sad history of the League. 
Fortunately the OAS has not been plagued by the financing of controversial 
peace and security operations. Its major problem is an insufficient budget. 
no( the financing of controversial activities. Hence the overall similarity to 
the League seems greater than that to the UN despite the structural 
similarities to the latter. 
23. Ibid., P. 191. 
24. Ibid., P. 192. 
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While political consensus in the Council of Europe may be somewhat 
higher than that in the OAS this consensus has been couched in such 
abstract and generalized terms that it has lost a great deal of substantive 
meaning. Moreover, though there may be agreement on the overall goal of 
political unification there are profound division on how this goal ma\ best 
be achieved. In addition, the Council is beset by structural difficulty that 
complicated the financial life of the League: the lack of clear fiscal 
authority in any one of the governing organs. 
On the whole, the UN can learn from the OAS and the Council of 
Europe. 
On the other hand, a sense of purpose and a considerable degree of 
consensus have permeated the economic organizations in Western Europe. 
None has serious financial difficulties, and all have been bold innovators 
in the quest for revenue. In theory the fiscal powers of the General 
Assembly under Article 17 as interpreted by the ICJ, are of greater 
importance. Once political consensus broadens and deepens, the taxing 
and borrowing powers of the ECSC. the borrowing power of EURATOM. 
and dual assessment scales and weighted voting systems of the ELI. may 
provide an invaluable laboratory for experimentation. 
The fundamental importantance of homogeneity as a condition of 
financial adequacy is underlined once more by the financial history of 
NATO. Its infrastrucmre programme was financed even though no scale 
of apportionment could be agreed on. It was financed because everyone 
agreed that the job had to be done. 
So, the regional organizations provide the UN with valuable insights 
from the past and for the present and future as well. Some point to follies 
15 
of the past that the UN has largely surmounted, others suggest 
improvements that may be attempted in the immediate present, hut most 
of the lessons may show their greatest value at a time when the attainment 
of greater political consensus among the membership will gi\e the 
Organization the power to strike out in new directions in iis constant 
search for revenue. 
History teaches through analogy, not identity. The lessons from the 
past suggest many warnings and a few hopes. The more recent lessons of 
regional organizations hold out much hope for the UN but onl\ in a 
relatively distant future. Armed with these perspectives, an analysis of the 
present, the financing of the UN system, will be undertaken. 
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^^a^bten^ - 2 
BUDGET APPROPRIATIONS AND ASSESSMENT OF 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UN 
In every system of government, some of the most difficult problems 
are those that concern money such as levying of taxes and control of 
expenditure. Within national states the power of the purse has been 
recognized for long as one of the most basic dimensions of political power. 
Different branches of government dispute in this regard. Disputes over 
what taxes are to be raised, and how they are to be spent, remain today 
as fundamental as any in politics. 
The UN has faced similar problems. The basic questions have been 
essentially the same: how 'taxation' that is contributions to international 
organizations should be raised and assessed; how to ensure payment of the 
contributions after assessment; and how expenditure b\ such organization 
can be adequately supervised and controlled by the member states. 
Today there is deeper understanding of wher^ the source of trouble 
lies in the world. There is an increasing awareness that security involves 
for more than question of land and weapons. Moreover, there is also 
realisation that the lack of economic, social and political developement is 
the underlying cause of conflict. In only redefining and bringing to 
fulfillment, a renewed vision of developement, can we begin to get at the 
roots of conflicts. In the process can be built, enduring foundations for a 
secure, just and creative era for all humanity. This is the primary mission 
of the UN in its second half century. 
But this great project cannot be fulfilled without a continuing 
commitment to it on the part of all nations. Today, that commitment is far 
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from satisfactory, as is evident from the fact that, this year only 17 out 
of 185 member stales made good on their assessed fmancial commitment 
to the Organization on time.' Not only have lack of resources hanstrung 
the UN's functioning, but the State's attitude also shows where their 
priorties lie. The record so far reveals that full and responsible participation 
in the UN is not a top priority on the agenda of most of the member states. 
Only the express will of the people can impress upon their 
governments the importance of committed participation in the UN. By 
deepening UN involvement with, and responsiveness to the concern of 
grassroots movements and non-governmental organization. Support can be 
strengthen from down to up, for a timely effective and universal 
organizations. 
Despite its importance the financial side of the UN has received 
little attention from American public or from authors and critics which is 
contributing one-fourth of the total UN regular assessment. For the most 
part the criticisms are general in character. Some people complain that the 
UN is spending too much; others insist that it is not spending enough. 
There is some fear that the Organization may be taking on too many 
activities, particularly in the relief and refugee fields where large and 
continuing expenditures may be involved. There are also criticisms that the 
US is still contributing too large a portion of the total UN budget and 
some of the other members have not assumed their fair share of expenses. 
Finally, there are some complaints that there is a certain amount of waste 
mainly through overlapping and duplication of effort within the UN system. 
1. Shambhavi Vedantum, United Nations: Putting World to Work. (New 
Delhi, 1996), P. 5. 
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How the financial provisions of the Charier worked out in practice? 
Where have funds for the UN come from and how have they been spent? 
What are the main problems that have arisen in financing the various 
activities of the UN. Such questions are of great interest to the people of 
the world. These questions are analysed in the following pages. The data 
and figures generally pertain to the early decades of the UN. Since the 
main focus of this dissertation is the financial crisis of UN during 1^960s. 
data from recent years is not generally provided in this work. 
The Charter Provisions: 
The main provisions of the Charter dealing with financial mailers 
are found in Article 17. 18, and 19." Article 17 provides thai. 
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the 
Organization. 
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borned by the members 
as apportioned by the General Assembly. 
3. The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and 
budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in 
Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such 
specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the 
agencies concerned. 
2. Leland M. Goodrich, Edvard Hambro and Anne Patriciasimons. The 
Charter of the UN: Commentary and Documents. (New York. 1969). 
PP. 149-181. 
Francis O. Wilcox and Carl M. Marey, Proposals for change in the 
United Nations. (Washington D.C.,1955) PP. 419-451. 
Margret E. Galey, Reforming the Regime for Financing the United 
Nations , Howard Law Journal vol. 31(4), 1988, PP. 543-74. 
Arm\ Vandenbasch and Willard N. Hogan, The United Nations: 
Background of Organization Functions and Activities (New York. 1952) 
Chapter 8-10. 
John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations System. (Washington 
D.C., 1964). Chapter-3. 
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Article 17 is the only one in the Charier that deals exclusively with 
the finances of the Organization.^ Several important points should be noted 
here in connection with this Article. In the first place the Charter makes 
it quite clear that ultimate budgetary authority lies with the Genera! 
Assembly. Article 6(5) of the Covenant of the League of Nations origmally 
provided that The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by members 
of the League in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the 
International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union .^  But in practice this 
provision was found to be too narrow in scope and unsatisfactory in 
operations. By an amendment on August 13, 1924, the following text was 
substituted; The expenses of the League shall be borne by the members 
of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly .^  
The Covenant of the League of Nations also had not contained any 
provision explicitly dealing with the authorization of expenditures and the 
review of financial operations. In practice, the Council initially assumed 
the function of approving the budget as prepared by the Secretary General. 
But the Assembly had asserted and established its exclusive right of 
approval. 
Furthermore, by 1928 the supervisory commission, initially 
appointed by the Council to assist in the review of the budget estimates 
and the supervision of financial administration, came under the exclusive 
control of the Assembly and its Fourth Committee (Finance).^ 
3. Article 33 and 35(3) of the Statute of the ICJ deal with the financing 
of that organ. 
4. Goodrich and Others, n.2., PP.. 149-69. 
5. Ibid. 
6. J. David Singer, The finances of the League of Nations . International 
Organizations. (Boston, New York). Vol.13, 1959, pp.155-73. 
Felix Morley, The Society of the Nations. (Washington DC. 1932). 
pp.500-544. 2^ 
The US proposals to give the Assembly the power to approve the 
budget of the organs and agencies of the Organization and to determine a 
provisional and a continuing basis of apportionment of expenses of the 
Organization among the member states, togather with the procedure of 
apportionment. In taking decisions with respect to these matter, each 
member states was to have voting power in proportion to its contribution 
10 the expenses of the Organization. The decisions were to be taken by 
two-thirds vote.'' These proposals with the exception of weighted voting 
were incorporated mto the Dumbartion Oak Proposals.** 
At the San Francisco Conference there was complete agreement that 
the Assembly should have the power to approve the budget and apportion 
expenses; and it was left free to the Assembly to decide the method of 
apportionment and the procedures of budgetary preparation and 
examination. The text finally approved was drafted to make clear the 
obligation of each member to pay its share of the expenses."* 
The matter of budgetary and financial arrangements was given 
detailed consideration by the Preparatory Commission and its Executive 
Committee and the recommendations of the Commission were in substance 
adopted by the Assembly in its first session.'° 
Article 17(3) has a different history. It was developed to achieve 
coordination of the policies and activities of the UN and the specialized 
agencies. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals gave the Economic and Social 
7. Goodrich and others, n.2, pp. 149-169. 
8. Ibid. 
9. Ibid. 
10. Report of the Preparatory Commission, pp.104-13. 
GA Res, 68(1) and 69(1), Dec 14, 1946, and 80(1), December 11 
1946. 
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Council ihe power to examine the administrative budgets of such specialized 
agencies." At San Francisco, it was dicided to give the power to the 
Assembly, as well as the related power to approve financial arrangements 
with the agencies.'^ 
The Budgetary Power: 
The UN Charter clearly implied that ultimate budgetary authority 
for the UN system resides in the General Assembly.'^ The power to consider 
and approve the budget is the basis of the Assmbly's control o\cr the 
expenditures of the Organization. This control extends to determining the 
manner in which estimates are presented, the procedure by which they are 
considered, the authorization of expenses, and the methods of accounting. 
The extent of the General Assembly control over expenditure is 
indicated by the following provision of the financial regulations,'" 
Regulation 13.1 : No council, commission or other competent body 
shall take a decision regarding expenditures unless it has before it a report 
from the Secretary-General on the Administration and financial implications 
of the proposal. 
Regulation 13.2: Wherein the opinion of the Secretary-General, the 
proposed expenditure can not be made from the existing appropriations, it 
shall not be incurred until the Assembly has made the necessary 
11. Goodrich and Others, n.2. pp. 149-69. 
12. Ibid. 
13. J. Singer, Financing the United Nations , International Organization. 
(Boston), Vol.13, 1959, pp.113-116. 
14. Financial Regulations were adopted by the General Assembly at its 
fifth session Res. 456(v). Nov 16. 1950 and Amanded at its tenth 
session. Res. 950(x) Nov. 3. 1955 and 973 B(x), Dec. 15. 1955. 
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appropriation, unless the Secretary-General certifies that provision can be 
made under the conditions of the Assembly resolutionrelating to unforseen 
and extraordinary expenses. 
The power of the General Assembly to consider and approve the 
budget and to authorize expenditures is subject to Charter provisions 
governing the functions and power of the UN and its organs.'^ The ICJ has 
suggested however that an expense incurred by an organ in excess of its 
powers may be an expense of the Organization under Article 17(2).'^ 
The Assembly control over expenditures is limited in another 
respect; it may not be free to disapprove a particular expenditure proposed 
to it. In the case of certain awards of compensation made by the UN 
Administrative Tribunal to United States nationals who had been terminated 
or dismissed from the UN Secretariat, the US representative argued that 
the General Assembly's power to consider and approve the budget extended 
to reviewing awards and refusing, to authorize payment of those found 
unsound.'^ In its opinion, given at the request of the Assembly and accepted 
by it, the ICJ observes that: 
The function of approving the budget does not mean that the General 
Assembly has an absolute power to approve or disapprove the expenditure 
proposed to it; for some part of that expenditure arises out of obligation 
already incurred by the Organization, and to this extent the General 
Assembly has no alternative but to honour these engagements.'** 
Similarly, the Court has observed that obligations may be incurred 
15. ICJ Reports. (1962). pp. 157-65 
16. Ibid, p.l69. 
17. Goodrich and others, n.2, pp. 150-52. 
18. ICJ Reports. (1962), p.l58. 
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by the Secretary-General, acting under the authority of the Security Council 
or the General Assembly, and that the Assembly has no alternative but to 
honour these engagement.'^ 
Budgetary Procedure: 
The regular budget of the Organization is prepared, considered, and 
approved on an annual basis. The financial year being the calender year, 
the budget is given as careful a scrutiny as any budget of a similar size 
anywhere in the world. Representatives from member states in the 
Assembly spend days debating relatively modest sums that would be 
considered by some national legislatures in a matter of hours or even 
minutes.-" So many important persons spent so much time on such a 
relatively small budget. 
The UN budget procedure is comparable to that used by the federal 
government of the US. Budget estimates for a particular fiscal year have 
been carefully worked out in the Secretariat, they are submitted to the 
Secretary-General for his approval. After Secretary General's approval, it 
is sent to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions of the Assembly at least twelve weeks prior to the opening of 
the regular annual session of the General Assembly, where they are studied 
in minute detail.-' This Committee normally spends four or five months 
reviewing the various programmes, hearing witness and preparing its 
recommendations for the use of the Assembly. The report of the Advisory 
Committee must be transmitted to members at least five weeks before the 
19. Ibid, p.169. 
20. Stoessinger, n.2, pp.90-93. 
21. Goodrich and others, n.2, pp. 152-154. 
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opening of the annual session." 
The final stage comes when Assembly is convened in September. 
The report of the Advisory Committee is considered by the Fifth 
Committee. At that time, the Fifth Committee of the Assembly gi\es the 
budget a close scrutiny normally devoting most of its session covering ten 
or eleven weeks in examining the estimates and debating financial and 
administrative matter. Both the Secretary General or his representative. 
and the Chairman of the Advisory Committee participate activel\ in the 
meetings of the Fifth Committee. The decisions are taken b\ simple 
majority. The final result, which is usually a bundle of compromises 
somewhere between the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and 
the Secretary-General is submitted to the General Assembly for its 
approval. The Committee's decisions are incorporated into a draft 
resolution, which must be approved by the General Assembly in plenary 
session by a two-thirds majority.-^ Revised estimates are prepared and 
considered in a similar way. and when approved are incorporated into 
annual appropriation resolution. 
The annual appropriation is not the only means by which the General 
Assembly authorizes expenditures. Each year, the Assembh adopts a 
resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses which authorizes the 
Secretary General, under certain conditions, to incur obligations and 
expenditures for which no provision has been made in the budget, 
unforeseen expenses cover additional obligations and expenditures arising 
22. Ibid. 
23.Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. Especially 
Regulations 3.1 to 3.7 and Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly. 
UNDOC. A/4700, Feb, 1961. 
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in connection with the implementation of approved programme provided 
for in the budget. Extraordinary expenses cover obligations and 
expenditures arising as the result of the approval by a Council, Commission 
or other competent UN body of new programmes and activities not 
contemplated when the budget was approved.^ '* 
As a result of the extraordinary financial demands of peace-keeping 
operations in the Middle East (UNEF) and the Congo (ONUC) the 
conditions under which the Secretary-General can authorize expenditures 
under the resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary expenses were re-
examined by the Assembly, under the terms of resolutions adopted up to 
1960, the Secretary-General, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions had practically 
unlimited authority to incure expenses for duly authorized activities. Since 
then, his authority has been more closely defined. The Assembly limited 
to $ 2 million the commitments the Secretary General Could enter into for 
fiscal year 1963 in the maintenance of peace without the concurrence of 
the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Question, and 
further provided that, as a result of a decision by the Security Council, 
commitments relating to the maintenance of peace and security should 
arise in an estimated total exceeding $ 10 million before the eighteenth 
session, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened by 
the Secretary-General to consider the matter.^ ^ 
In addition to authorizations the regular budget resolution and the 
24.ICJ Pleading. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, 
Paragraph 2 of the Charter , p.42. 
25.General Assembly Resolution, 1962 (xvii), Dec. 20, 1962, and GA. 
Res. 2126 (xx), Dec. 21, 1965. 
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resolution relating to unforeseen and extraordinary expenses, the General 
may authorize expenditures by special resolutions. In the case of peace-
keeping operations which have necessitated excqjtionally large 
expenditures, special authorizations have been voted by the Assembly 
following submission of estimates by the Secretary- General, and 
examination and recommendation by the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Question.^^ 
Appropriations approved by the Assembly on the basis of the annual 
budget estimates submitted by the Secretary-General have progressively . 
increased over the years in response to increased membership, increasing 
needs and higher price levels. Proposals to establish budget ceilings, either 
for the whole budget or for the administrative budget as distinguished from 
the operational, have not been accepted.^^ Since 1956. special 
appropriations have been made for UNEF and ONUC. 
A study of the regular budget figures since 1946 reveals some 
interesting facts. While the US contribution has been reduced from 49.89 
percent to 33.33 percent in 1952, 30 percent in 1955 and 25 percent in 
1972 which is continuing till today. According to the criteria applied 
uniformly for determining the capacity to pay, US should be paying 31 
percent of the budget instead of 25 percent. The Soviet assessment has 
been increased by about the same amount, from 7.73 percent in 1946 to 
14.15 percent in 1954, and then after their disintegration into 15 states its 
26.GA. Res. 1090 (xi), Feb. 27, 1951, 1964 (xvii), Dec. 20, 1962 on 
UNEF and 1590 (xvi), Dec. 20, 1960 and 1965 (xvii) Dec. 20. 1962 
on ONUC. 
27.The Assembly in 1959 ask the Secretary-General to limit the public 
information expenditure for 1960 to about $ 5 million , GA. Res 1405 
(NIV), Dec. 1, 1959. 
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contribution reduced to 6.71 in 1992. The ten top contributors constitute 
the elite among the major donors. They include, the US currently assessed 
at 25 percent; Japan, 12.45 percent, Russia, 6.71; Germany, 8.93 percent; 
France 6 percent; UK, 5.02 percent; Italy, 4.29 percent; Canada 3.11 
percent; Spain, 1.98 percent and the Ukraine, 1.87 percent. Altogether the 
top ten donors contributing 75.36 percent of the UN's regular budget.''^ 
Majority of states were initially assessed the minimum of 0.04 
percent prior to 1973; their assessment was lowered to 0.02 percent in 
1973 and then in 1978 to 0.01 percent. Under the current (1994) scale, 
170 out of 185 states were assessed 0.01 percent or a total of 25 percent 
of the UN's regular budget.-'^ 
Assessment and Appropriations: 
Article 17.2 is the corollary to Article 17.1. It contains a related 
principle, namely that the expenses of the Organization shall be borne by 
the members as apportioned by the UN General Assembly. So. this 
paragraph gives the Assembly power to apportion expenses of the 
Organization among members and placed upon them the obligation to pay 
the amounts thus determined. In UN pratice, disagreements that have 
arisen have related principally to the interpretation and application of this 
paragraph with respect to expenses incurred in coimection with operations 
involving the use of armed force. 
The assessment principle was implied but not spelled out in detail 
in Article 17. The committee on financial arrangements recommended in 
late 1945 that the task of preparing a detailed scheme be entrusted by the 
28. The Europa World Yearbook. (London, 1995), Vol.11, p.3. 
29. Ibid. 
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General Assembly to an expert committee on Contributions whose members 
were to serve for relatively long terms be selected on the basis of broad 
geographical representation and experience and be nationals of different 
states.^" 
After some preliminary discussion, it was decided at San Francisco 
to leave the details regarding the method of apportionment to the future 
determination of the General Assembly. To apportion expenses, the UN 
preparatory committee recommended that an expert committee be 
established for this purpose and apportion expenses by a capacity to pay 
formula and that a working capital fund cover the initial expenses and any 
contingencies. This Committee, in preparing the assessment scale, was 
instructed to take into account member states capacity to pay as determined 
by four criteria; total national income; per capita income, war caused 
economic dislocation and ability to acquire foreign currency (dollar).^' 
In accordance with a resolution approved in 1946, that no member 
should be required to contribute more than one-thirds of the regular 
budget.^- In 1946, the committee on contributions recommended that the 
US, based on its ability to pay should contribute 49.89 percent of the total. 
The US protested the apportionment on the ground that the UN is an 
30. Stoessinger, n.2, pp.82-85. 
31. The committee on contributions is a special committee of ten members 
elected by the General Assembly and Serving as individual. The 
committee is charged among the other things, with the responsibility of 
determining the capacity of states to pay and recommending to the 
General Assembly the apportionment of expenses among the members. 
It is review every three years and must be approved by UN General 
Assembly, Res. 14(1) Feb. 13, 1946. 
32. Scale of contributions to the Budget of the United Nations for the 
Financial year 1946 and 1947 and to the Working Capital Fund . Res. 
69(1), Dec.l4, 1946. 
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Organization of sovereign equals and that it would be unwise for any one 
member to bear a preponderance of the administrative costs. Such a 
situation was viewed as conducive to making the Organization too 
dependent on a single member, and opened the way for the member in 
question possibly to exert an undue influence in the management of the 
Organization. 
The ten-member committee on contribution has a broad mandate 
and hence a very delicated job. Its history has been quite stormy. One of 
the principal difficulties confronting it in determining the capacity of 
members to pay has resulted from the lack of adequate statistics, complete 
and accurate data on production, national incomes and related matters do 
not exist, and when they do exist, they are subject to different 
interpretations. To help the committee's evaluation of capacity to pay the 
UN statistical office was instructed to gather the relevant information as 
quickly as possible. Although the committee found some lacunae in the 
figures submitted to the statistical office, it nevertheless proposed a scale 
for the first three years of UN operations. The states in the Soviet orbit 
in particular have been inclined either to withhold their economic statistics 
or to twist them to suit their own purpose. 
The proposed US assessment almost half the total budget was most 
controversial. The country's delegation objected strongly on two grounds. 
Senator Arthar Vandenberg pointed out, that the 49.89 percent figure was 
not an accurate reflection of the US capacity to pay. Moreover, even if the 
figures were accurate, it would be unwise to make the Organization so 
dependent upon the financial contribution of one member. Instead he 
proposed that no state should be assessed more than one-third of the total 
'^ 0 
budget. Neverthless, the US agreed to a temporary assessment of 39.89 
percent for 1946. 
During the next ten years the US gradually succeeded in having its 
assessment reduced to the one-third ceiling and a further agreement was 
reached to reduce the maximum assessment to one-fourth in 1972; which 
is continuing till today. 
During the ten year battle in the committee on contributions 
statistical information gradually improved, war damages were repaired, the 
European economies recovered, and momentous changes occurred in the 
international balance of payments. All these developments were reflected 
in the annual alterations made by the committee in the assessment scale. 
By 1965 a formula for the first time was codified for a three year period. 
The US was reduced to the one-third limit, the Soviet shared increased to 
nearly 14 percent and the UK assessment lowered to less than 10 percent. 
The battle in the contributions committee, however, was not merely 
a reflection of the East-West struggle. The one-third ceiling suggested by 
the US elicited in 1954 a Canadian demand for a ceiling on any member 
states per-capita assessment, in addition to the ceiling on its total 
assessment. The net effect would have been that countries with high 
national incomes and small populations would not be assessed more per 
capita than the US. The Canadian plan was vigorously opposed by the 
delegates from the small developing countries on the ground that it would 
lead to a greater financial burden for the poor countries. As a result, a 
compromise resolution was adopted in which those countries whose per 
capita assessment exceeded that of the US (Canada, New Zealand. Sweden 
and Iceland) were promised that the difference between their per capita 
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assessment and that of the US would not increase. This meant that countries 
such as Canada and Sweden, with relatively small populations and high 
incomes, should not contribute more per capita than the US.^' This 
principle has not proved entirely practicable, since the US contribution has 
been reduced to 25 percent comparable reduction for other high income , 
countries could only means that a greater financial burden would fall on 
the poor. 
Since 1956 the committee on contributions has had little more than 
routine responsibilities. The basic pattern of assessment has been set and 
the changes in each subsequent evaluation have been minor. The admission 
of new states has made little difference in total revenues. Most of the new-
African nations have been assessed the minimum of 0.01 percent. Not only 
has the increase in membership not resulted in an appreciable reduction in 
the share of member states already in the Organization but the cost of 
alterations as UN headquarters to accomodate the increased membership 
has required an increase in the older member's contributions. 
On the whole, three of the four original criteria determining a 
nations capacity to pay are still employed by the committee on 
contributions. Total national income and per capita income are the most 
important of these countries. The criterion of war-caused economic 
dislocation, while still invoke by the Eastern European countries has been 
disclaimed by the committee, which has held that since these dislocation 
are largely reflected in national income figures, they no longer justify 
special reductions. The ability to acquire foreign currencies is taken into 
account in that some govermnents are permitted to pay all or part of their 
33. General Assembly Official Record, 11th session, 1955. Supp. 
10(73121), Paras.12-15. 
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contributions in local currencies. However, acceptance of local currencies 
is entirely dependent on the use the UN may have for such currencies. All 
told, the scale of assessment for the regular budget is determined by using 
total national income and per capita income figures as a base, with 
modifications for ceilings and floors. 
The method used by the committee on countributions to calculate 
assessment scale was set forth in its 1961 report. Two figures are used as 
a base for each country; a national income figure and a population figure. 
UN sources are used throughout, but upward adjustments are made for the 
national income statistics of the Soviet bloc countries. The second step is 
to adjust the national income of each country with a per capita income of 
less than $ 1.000 a year downward by a formula described by the committee 
as follows. 
A deduction is made from the national income of each country with 
a per capita income equivalent to less than $ 1,000. The difference between 
$ 1,000 and a country's per capita income is expressed as a percentage, 
and 50 percent of that percentage is deducted from the country's national 
income for the purpose of arriving at the assessment. Thus, since the 
allowance is progressive, the lower the per capita, income the more nearly 
the percentage deduction approaches 50 percent of the national income, 
while a country with a per capita income of $ 1,000 or over receives no 
reduction at all.^ '* 
By resolution of the General Assembly the maximum assessment 
was reduced to one-third and consequently to a target of 25 percent. A 
34. UN, GA. Sixteenth Session, Official Record Supplement No. 10, 
Doc. A/4775(1961), P.3. 
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minimum assessment of 0.04 percent was also set for the states with the 
lowest assets. In 1973 this minimum was reduced to 0.02 percent and in 
1978 to 0.01 percent. Next, if a country's per capita contribution exceeds 
that of the largest contributor, its percentage is lowered to the point where 
its per capita contribution equals that of the largest contributor. When 
nations are admitted to the UN after a scale is approved, they are usually 
assessed a percentage that is added to the total of 100 percent yielding a 
total of percentage slightly above 100 percent. ^ ^ 
Surveing the present pattern of assessment; one conclusion is striking 
that a large portion of the UN regular budget is dependent on a very small 
minority of the membership. Since eighty five members pay the minimum 
0.01 percent each and another nine pay 0.02 percent and seven 0.03 
percent each, it is theoretically possible for a majority of the General 
Assembly represent a total contribution of less than 1 percent of the 
budget. At the other extreme, the ten largest contributors pay three-fourths 
of the budget but cost fewer than 7 percent of the vote. The include the 
US , currently assessed at 25 percent, Japan, 12.45 percent Germany 8.93 
percent, Russia, 6.71 percent, France, 6 percent, UK, 5.2 percent. Italy 
4.29 percent, Canada 3.11 percent, Spain, 1.98 percent, and the Ukraine, 
1.87 percent.^^ 
The Regular Budget: 
In the case of the regular budget the collection of contribution has 
not posed a serious problem. Every year a number of state lag behind, but 
the total arrears has never exceeded 15 percent of the entire budget. Some 
35. Ibid. 
36. The Europa World Yearbook, n.28, p.3. 
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members fall almost two years behind but always manage to compicic their 
contributions before the question of invoking Article 19 arises. 
The experience of the League of Nations has demonstrated the 
importance of a bank balance in the conduct of international adminsiration. . 
The preparatory commission of the UN proposed that such a fund should 
form an essential part of the regular budget and permanent financial 
arrangements of the UN. This fund was to render the UN precisch the 
kind of service that working capital renders to any other enterprise. First, 
there usually is a lag between the billing of current accounts, or 
certification of assessments and their collection, and the Organization must 
live during the interim. Second, no matter how clairvoyant the budgetary 
process it is impossible to anticipate all possible contingencies, and when 
unanticipated contingencies arise funds must be available to meet them 
Hence, the General Assembly in 1946 authorized a working capital fund 
from which the Secretary-General was authorized to advance. Such funds 
as may be necessary to finance budgetary appropriations pending receipt 
of contribution." 
Until the Congo crisis of 1960 threatened the entire financial UN 
structure, the working capital fund was sucessful device for meeting 
emergencies. Not. only it was essential for cushioning arrears, bu; it also 
financed minor peace-keeping operations such as the Truce Supervision 
Organization in Palestine and Military Observer Group in India and 
Pakistan untill these were integrated into the regular budget under the 
heading of special mission . After the Congo crisis it was drawn on to 
cover some of the deficits of the peace forces and as a result was constantly 
37. J. David Singer. Fin.mcing InternationalOrganization: The United 
Nations Budget Process. (The Hague, 1961) pp. 147-153. 
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depleted. If the working capital fund prove inadequate the Secretary-
General is authorized to utilize cash from special funds and account in his 
custody such borrowing has taken place on a number of occasions. Each 
year the General Assembly also passess a resolution pertaining to 
unforeseen and exiraord-inary expenditures sums of up to $ 2 million 
may be committed for administrative and budgetary question provided the 
Secretary-General certifies that the funds relate to the maintenance of 
peace and security . At times the Advisory Committee permits the 
Secretary- General to exceed this limit. JH 
In its attempts to close the gap between assessment and payment, the 
Assembly has also empowered the Secretary-General to accept funds in 
currencies other than US dollars.^ "^ Although originally contributions were 
to be assessed and paid in the currency of the host country, in practice 
the Secretary- General has found it possible each year to accept a certain 
sum in other currencies which has fluctuated over the years between 5 
percent and 35 percent of the total budget. 
The practice of accepting non-dollars payment has not created 
serious problems for the UN for two reasons. The first has been the 
stabilization of currencies and the progressive removal of currencies 
exchange restrictions that have come about under the leadership of the 
IMF and in consequence of massive programmes of international economic 
aid and investment by the US and other major powers as well as by 
multilateral agencies such as the World Bank. The second has been the 
geographical dispersion of UN activities which has increased UN 
requirements for many currencies and made the acceptance of assessed 
38. Stoessinger, n.2. pp.87-90. 
39. Ibid. 
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contributions in other than dollars, both feasible and desirable. 
Approximately one-third of regular budget assessment are nowcoilccicd in 
non dollars currencies. 
Not all the costs of maintaining the regular operations of the DN 
must be assessed against the members, but neither does the budget 
represent the full costs of UN membership. The UN raises approximately 
25 million dollars, annually from miscellaneous income from sales and 
services and about five times that ammount is derived from staff 
assessments made against Secretariat salaries to offset income tax pa>menis 
of employees who are US nationals.^" To the assessments levied against 
each member state must be added the expenses of maintaining a mission 
headquarters and staff in New York and for, most members, maintami'ig 
smaller staff in Geneva and at the headquarters of the Specialized Agencies. 
For the least affluent states these costs generally exceed the amount of the 
regular budget assessment. 
Under the Financial Regulations of the UN the miscellaneous income 
helps to finance the regular budget and serves to reduce the assessment of 
each member state by a modest amount. 
UN Programme: 
Apart from administrative costs and those of technical programmes 
included in the regular budget, operational expense^ in the economic. 
social, and humanitarian fields have been met by voluntary contributions 
This permits greater flexibility in the establishment and implementation o 
programmes. Although it may be inferred from the opinion of the iCJ in 
40. A. LeRoy Bennett, International Organizations Principles and Issues. 
(New Jersey: Prentice Hall International, 1988), pp.90-97. 
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the certain expenses case that costs of economic and field operations may 
be considered expenses of the Organization and therefore subject to binding 
apportionment by the General Assembly/' That organ has not seen fit to 
treat the cost of such major operations in this manner. To do so would 
unquestionably create additional obstacles to their establishment: it would 
lead to large scale refusals to contribute, and would limit the possibilities 
of participation by non-member states. 
Since the establishment of the UN children's fund (UNICEF) in 
1946. the UN has supplemented its regular budgets with special budgets 
for economic and social programmes. These budgets are supported by 
voluntary contibutions rather than assessment. Special accounts are 
established by General Assembly resolution and the funds are administered 
in accordance with the Financial Rules and Regulations of the UN. Some 
of the major funds in this category in addition to UNICEF are the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) with an annual budget of more than 700 
million dollars; the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugee, 
the World Food Programmes and voluntary funds administered b\ the UN 
High Commissioner for Regugees.^-
Contributions by members to these special accounts differs markedly 
from those made to the regular budget in accordance with the scale 
prescribed by the General Assembly. Since all members are free to 
determine whether and how much they will contribute to these funds, the 
patterns of contribution vary widely from the assessment figures of the 
regular budget For many years the US pledged 30-80 percent of these 
special funds with a fixed dollars limit but this previous generosity has 
41. ICJ Report. 1962, p.l68. 
42. Bennett, n.40. pp.90-97. 
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given way to an attitude in the US Congress of cutting most voluntary 
contribution to 25 percent or less. 
Peace-keeping Operations: 
The question of the manner of financing peace-keeping operations 
did not arise until the establishment of the UN Emergency Force iUNEF) 
in 1956. The peace-keeping expenses, has been the most controversial and 
has caused the financial crisis that become critical with the establishment 
of the UN Force in the Congo (ONUC) in the 1960s and that has continued 
as one of the threats to the stability and viability of the Organization. The 
principal problem has resulted from attempts to assess peace-keeping costs 
on the same basis as regular buget assessments, although separate accounts 
were set up for each major peace-keeping operation. The high cost. 
especially of the Congo operation, also exacerbated the problem. It would 
seem that this question had not arisen in the minds of the drafters of die 
Charter. They had presumably anticipated that the costs of military 
enforcement measure under Article 42 would be borne by the contributions 
of military contingents according to agreements concluded under Arncle 
43. and that the great powers would bear the major part of the costs. 
Failure to conclude agreements under article 43 and inability of the 
permanent members to agree on the use of military forces precluded the 
financing of such programmes as the authors of the Charter apparently 
intended. 
It is generally accepted today that the UNEF was a political and 
military milestone for the UN. For the first time an international body 
decided that the costs of such an international force should be shared by 
the nations of the world community. This dicision was to have far-reachmg 
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consequences. 
When on 2 November 1956, the General Assembly was locked in 
bluer debate over the British. French, Israel action in Suez. Lester Pearson 
of Canada proposed that peace and security be restore through a UN force. 
The Canadian draft resolution was passed without a negative vote and the 
Secretary-General set about improvising the force. After a great deal of 
delicated maneuvering 6,000 troops of contingents from ten coniries 
Brazil, Canada. Colombia, Denmark, Finland, India. Indonesia. Norway. 
Sweden and Yogoslavia were sent to conflict area. 
The earlier manifestations of the crisis surfaced with the refusal of 
the Soviet bloc and several Arab States to contribute to the support of the 
UNEF, established in 1956. In spite of opposition and bitter debate, the 
proposal of the Secretary-General to assess the costs on the same basis as 
the regular assessment received the necessary support for adoption by the 
Assembly. When ONUC. was created in 1960, the application of the same 
formula created greater problems because the annual costs of the Congo 
operation were greater than the entire regular UN budget and because 
additional member, including France, refused to pay the peace-keeping 
assessments. The total UN cost of the UNEF from 1956 to 1967 was 
approximately 200 million dollars, and the cost of the ONUC from 1960 
until its withdrawal in 1964 was in excess of 400 million dollars. These 
costs are exclusive of the ordinary costs of salaries and equipment of the 
forces, which are borne by the states that furnish the forces. In earlier 
operations such as the UN Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine 
(UNTSO) and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
(UNMOGIP), the costs had amounted to less than $ 3 million and had 
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been included in the regular budget. In the cases of UNEF and ONUC 
separate accounts were set up with special expense authorizations by the 
Assembly but with clear affirmations by the Secretary-General and the 
Assembly that these expenditures were to be treated as expenses of the 
Organization to be borne by the members as apportioned by the Assembly/^ 
In its efforts to provide funds to meet the expenses of UNEF and ONUC, 
the Assembly relied initially on a combination of voluntary contributions 
and compulsory assessments/" 
Because of failure of some members of UN including major 
contributors to the regular budget to pay their apportioned shares of the 
expenses of these operations a serious financial as well as constitutional 
crisis developed during the period 1960-66. The question of how UN 
peace-keeping operations might be financed to avoid such a crisis in the 
future, along with the question of how to eliminate the defecit that had 
arisen as the result of failure of members to pay, was the central concern 
of UN members during this time. 
Broadly speaking three positions havj been taken. One group of 
members including the US and a number of Western members have 
maintained that peace-keeping operations may be initiated by the Assembly 
in case the Security Council is unable to act in the discharge of its primary 
responsibility; that the expenses of peace-keeping operations are expenses 
of the Organization,*^ that the Assembly has the power to apportion these 
expenses and in doing so to determine the amounts members are obligated 
43. UNDOC. A/3302, Nov.6, 1956, and GA. Res. 100/(ES-1), N0V.7, 
1956, 1089(xi), Dec.21, 1956, and 1583(xv), Dec.20, 1960. 
44. GA. Res. 1022(xi), Nov.26, 1956, 1089(N), Feb.27, 1957, for UNEF, 
1583(xv), Dec.20, 1960 and 1619(xv), April. 12, 1961, for ONUC. 
45. Goodrich and others, n.2, pp.157. 
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to pay; and that in apportioning expenses the Assembly may use the same 
scale as in the regular budget or modified scale, although it may decide 
to rely in whole or in part on contributions. The essence of this position 
has been that the principle of collective financial responsibility should be 
respected, that all members should pay something, and that no member. 
should pay a disproportionate share."'' 
A second group, including the Soviet Union, other socialists states, 
and generally France has taken an opposite position; it denies the right of 
the Assembly to initiate operations involving the use of armed forces. 
denies that expenses of these operations are expenses of the Organization 
under Article 17.2; asserts that expenses of the Organization are expenses 
covered by the regular budget and are strictly administrative in nature; 
and claims for the Security Council tlie exclusive authority to allocate 
expenses of peace-keeping operations on a binding basis. The Soviet Union 
and other socialist members would place the major burden of payment on 
those responsible for the situation requiring the use of armed forces."^ 
Until 1963, the Soviet Union and other Socialist member had paid in full 
their contributions under the regular budget which included the costs of 
the Truce Supervisory Organization in Palestine, the UN commission for 
the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea, and the UN field service. In 
1963, these members announced that they would not contribute to these 
costs and the costs of the UN bond issue even though included in the 
regular budget. They took the position that they were not bound to pay 
contributions under the regular budget to the extent that expenses resulting 
46. Ibid, pp. 158-159. ~~ , 
47. Ibid, pp. 160-62. 
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4X from the use of military forces were included in it. 
A third position taken by many Latin American. African, and Asian 
members, is that the Assembly has the power to initiate peacekeeping 
operations if the Security Council fails to act; that the expenses ot such 
operations may be apportioned by the Assembly but should not be regarded 
as normal expenses to be financed in the same manner as the regular 
budget that these expenses should be apportioned in accordance with 
special criteria which would recognize the special responsibilities of certain 
members of the Council; and that other members should only be expected 
to make contributions of a symbolic character as a token of international 
solidirity.^'^ 
In the Fifteenth General Assembly session the resolution approved 
for the financing of ONUC for the period January 1 to October 31. 1961, 
recognized in its preamble that the extraordinary expenses of the Congo 
operation were different in nature from the expenses of the regular budget. 
It provided for the apportionment of expenses up to $ 100 million in 
accordance with the scale of regular budget pending the establishment of 
a different scale of assessment , it specified reduction of 50 to 80 percent 
for certain members based on their low contributions to the regular budget 
and receipt of technical assistance. In addition, all members were urged to 
make voluntary contributions; permanent members of the Security Council 
were urged to make sizable additional contributions . and Belgium a state 
directly concerned was called upon to make a substantial contribution.-" 
48. Ibid, pp. 163-64. 
49. Ibid, pp.165. 
50. G.A. Res. 1619(xv). Apr.21, 1961, authorizing expenditures to cover 
the period Nov.l, 1961 to June 30, 1962, contain similar provisions as 
did GA Res. 1733(xvi), Dec.20. 1961 for financing UNEF. 
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This resolution obtained the necessary two-third majority.'*' but 
provided no solution to the financial problem because of the refusal of 
some members to be bound by it. Ii, an effort to find a generally 
satisfactory solution, the Assembly established a working group to consider 
methods for covering the costs of peace-keeping operations and the relations 
between such methods and existing administrative and budgetary methods." 
This body in its report to the sixteenth session of the Assembly was not 
able to identify principle for the financing of peace-keeping operations that 
would meet with general acceptance." 
In order to clarify the legal aspects of the financial dispute, the 
Assembly decided, at its sixteenth session, in 1960 to ask the International 
Court of Justice for an advisory opinion.^'' On July 20, 1962. the Court 
gave its opinion, by a vote of 9 to 5, that, the expenditures in question 
constitute expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17. 
Paragraph 2. of the Charter of the UN." In reaching this conclusion the 
Court took the position that expenditures must be tested by their 
relationship to the purposes of the UN and did not exclude the possibility 
that expenses incurred by organs in excess of their competence were to be 
regarded as expenses of the Organization." The Assembly, in its 
Seventeenth session, by a vote of 75 to 17 with 14 abstentions, decided to 
accept the Court's opinion.^' 
51. The vote was 54 to 15 with 23 abstentions. 
52. GA. Res. 1620(xv). April.21, 1961. The group was subsequently 
referred to as the working group on the Examinations of the 
Administrative and Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations. 
53. UNDOC. A/4971, Nov. 15, 1961. 
54. GA. Res. 1731(xvi), Dec.20. 1961. 
55. ICJ Report. 1962, p. 151. 
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General Assembly resolutions and Court opinions were insulticlent, 
however, to raise the necessary funds for the peace-keeping operation on 
the day the Assembly accepted the opinion of the Court, it adopted a 
second resolution re-establishing the 1961 working group with its 
membership increased from fifteen to twenty-one to study special methods 
for financing UN peace-keeping operations involving heavy expenditures, 
such as those for the Congo and the Middle East, including a possible 
special scale of assessments.^** The Secretary-General drew on the working 
capital fund, and some member states made voluntary contribution, but the 
expenses of simultaneously maintaining two peace-keeping forces exceeded 
the available financial resources of the UN. As an emergency measure the 
1961 Assembly authorized the issuance of $ 200 million worth of UN 
bonds to be repaid in installments over a twenty five year period. 
Approximately 85 percent of the authorized limit was subscribed to. with 
the US purchasing 50 percent of the total. This temporary stopgap failed 
to solve the permanent problem. 
The financial crisis came to a head in the 1964 Assembly session. 
A provision of Article 19 of the Charter states that a member that is at 
least two years in arrears in its budget contributions shall be deprived of 
its vote in the Assembly. The Soviet Union, becuase of its refusal to pay 
peace keeping costs, was more than two years deliquent and France would 
reach that point before the Assembly was scheduled to adjourn. The US 
threatened to apply Article 19, and the former Soviet Union indicated tiiat 
if the sanction were applied, it would leave the Organization. The contest 
of wills resulted in a stalemate, and a strange phenomenon ensued. A 
58. GA. Res, (xvii). 
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voteless session of the Assembly was conducted during which all necessary 
decisions were taken by consensus through informal consultation of the 
President of the Assembly with the delegates. Votes were actually registered 
in the anteroom instead of on the Assembly floor. Thus, a gentlemen's 
agreement to postpone the showdown permitted the Organization to survive 
what threatened to be its deathblow, at least as a nearly universal 
Organization. 
By the opening of the twentieth session of the Assembly in 1965. 
the US abandoned its attempt to enforce Article 19, since it lack support 
from most members for such extreme sanctions. In 1965 a committee of 
thirty-three was established to review the financial dilemma resulting from 
the peace-keeping issue. Since that time a series of commitees lias not 
been able to resolve the problems in a manner acceptable to all parties. 
A suggestion was adopted in 1965 to call for voluntary contribution to 
lessen the bankrupt position of the UN; and the understanding seemed lo 
be that the Soviet Union and France would contribute if they were tree to 
choose their own terms of contributions. In the game of power politics, the 
UN was the destitute stepchild. The Soviet Union not, only refused to pay 
for peace-keeping operations but withheld from its regular budget 
assessments amounts equal to its share of the service debt for UN bonds.In 
the 1980's the US also withlield funds from UN programmes of which it 
disapproved. 
As a practical matter the UN has sought alternative means of 
financing other peace-keeping operations. The Security Council established 
the UN force in Syprus (UNFICYP) in March 1964, and provided that its 
financing should come from three sources. (1) the governments providing 
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the contingents; (2) the government of Cyprus; and (3) voluntary' 
contributions. The mandate for the force has been continued from year to 
year, and financial support has been not secure, but the solution has 
proven less troublesome than the financing of the UNEF or the ONUC. 
The costs of a UN Observation Mission in Yemen and of an executive 
authority and a supporting security force in West Iran were split equally 
by the contending governments. 
Somewhat surprisingly, in the height of previous financial 
difficulties, the Security Council, authorizing in October 1973 a new 
7.000 member peace-keeping force in the Middle East, provided for its 
costs to be assessed on a modified scale based on the regular budget. The • 
major powers could supports this decision since it was made in the Security 
Council, which is considered by the Soviet Union and France the proper 
arena for such action. In 1978 peace-keeping force in Lebanon, was 
similarly authorized by the Security Council, but both the Soviet Union 
and China announced their refusal to contribute to its financial support. 
However, China later reversed its decision and assumed its share effective 
January 1, 1982. 
The UN never recovered from the financial crisis of the 1960s but 
a further catastrophic blow to UN solvency and programme maintenance 
threatened in 1986 and 1987. The US Congress adopted the so called 
Kassebaum Amendment, which dictated that unless the UN replaced the 
one-state one-vote requirement on budgetary questions with weighted votmg 
based on the size of a member's assessed contribution, the US would 
unilaterally reduce its contribution from 25 percent to 20 percent of the 
regular budget. Not only is this action a violation of US treaty obligations 
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in the Charter, but the change in the voting procedure requires an 
amendment of the Charter which would be impossible to achieve. 
With the unilateral action of the US, by the end of 1986 a total 
shortfall of $ 250 million, one-third of the UN budget face the 
Organization. In late April 1986 the members were in arrears b> almost 
125 million dollars on assessed amounts from previous years, with the US 
owing one-third of those arrears. Financial realities dictated either ;. drastic 
cut in UN personnel and programmes or a new assessment Scale to 
legalize the lower US contributions. The Assembly created a special Group 
of 18 experts in February 1986 to seek a long term solution to the problem. 
In August 1986, this Group, which became known as the Committee of 
Eighteen, produced its report called the 'Review of the Efficiency of the 
Administrative and Financial Functioning of the UN." But could not able 
to solve the long term problem of the Organization, which may be 
acceptable to all the UN members. So. the peace-keeping operations of the 
UN is permitted to carry out face, uncertainty of resources and frequently 
run into problems. 
As noted earlier Article 17.3 of the UN Charter provides that the 
UN General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and 
budgetary arrangements with Specialized Agencies referred to in Article 57 
and shall examine their administrative budgets. 
The budget of the Specialized Agencies are affiliated with the UN 
through the Economic and Social Council. As a part of the autonomous 
character of these agencies, each enjoys a high degree of independence in 
determining its budget, with probably the most effective coordinating 
control operating through member goverments. The Assembly is limited to 
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reviewing and making recommendations on these budgets. Since the UN 
and the Specialized Agencies shares a great deal of responsibility for 
economic development and technical assistant prograrnmes, including a 
division of the funds pledged to the UN development programme controls 
also operate through administrative coordinating agencies within this sphere 
of activities. 
Within each of the Specialized Agencies, budgetary assessments are. 
allocated on a scale roughly equivalent to that for the UN regular budget. 
The total of all the budgets of the Specialized Agencies generally exceeds 
that of the regular budget of the UN. 
In addition to Article 17. which deals with the finances of the 
Organizations are Article 18, and 19. Article 18 deals with voting 
procedure in the Assembly. It is relevant to fmance in the sense that it 
deals the voting procedure in the Assembly on budgetary question. 
According to Article 18.2 of the Charter, any decision of the 
Assembly on substantive issues, which include all financial matters, is 
taken by a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting. But the 
League of Nations required unanimity on budgetary matters and was often 
almost paralized as a result. This principle was scrupulously adhere to 
until the early 1980s when the major contributors started unfolding their 
designs on the budget. They wanted arbitrarily freeze the budgets of the 
UN system or even to reduce them in real terms. They, therefore, sought 
to acquire a veto on the decision on the budgets. They achiexed this 
purpose in 1986 when the president of the General Assembly made a 
consensus statement to the effect that the Fifth Committee of the Assembly 
make all possible efforts with a view to establishing the broadest possible 
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agreement on the budget. The US and other developed countries look it 
to mean the approval of the budget by consensus. Since then the UN 
budget and those of the Specialized Agencies have been appro\cd by 
consensus, that is under the veto power of the developed countries. As a 
consequence all regular budgets of the UN system have remained more or 
less frozen for the last 11 years. 
Article 19. incorporated one more lesson that the framers learni 
from precedent. Nothing in the League Covenant had provided for action 
in case of failure by a member state to pay its assessed contributions. As 
a result. League members had accumulated arrears without inhibitions. 
The San Francisco Conference after weighing several possible Penalties; 
decided on the loss of voting privileges in the Assembly as slated in 
Article 19. 
A Member of the UN which is in arrears in the pay mem of its 
financial contributions to the Organization shall have no vote in the General 
Assembly if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount o\' the 
contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The General 
Assembly may, nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it satisfied 
that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the 
member. 
The question of the application of Article 19 first came in the 
Fourth Special Session of Assembly in May, 1963. when the Secretary-
General reported in a letter to the President of Assembly that Haiti was 
in arrears in the payment of its financial contribution within the terms of 
Article 19 . He stated that the contributions due from Haiti exceeded by 
$ 22,400, the amount of the contributions due from it for the preceeding 
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two full years; and that a payment exceeding that amount would be 
necessary in order to reduce the arrears below the limit specified in 
Article 19. In reply, the president (Zafrulla Khan) stated that he would 
have made an announcement drawing the attention of the Assembl> to the 
loss of voting rights in the Assembly. Subsequently, before the occasion of 
a formal vote arose, a payment was made by Haiti making the first sentence 
of Article 19 inapplicable. 
The question of the interpretation and application of Ariicle 19 
became critical at the nineteenth session of the Assembly as a result of the 
failure of members to pay their apportioned shares of the expenses of the 
UNEF and ONUC. As of October 4, 1964, ten members, including the 
Soviet Union were in arrears in their contributions in amounts equal to or 
in excess of their assessed contributions for 1962 and 1963. if assessments 
for UNEF and ONUC were included. If these assessments were not 
included only one member that is Paraguay was deliquent. By February 3. 
1965, thirteen members including the Soviet Union and France, were two 
years in arrears, on the assumption that UNEF and ONUC expenses were 
included.^^ 
The Soviet position, supported in substance by France, was that the 
arrears to which Article 19 applies are arrears in the payment of expenses 
under 17, which do not include expenditures for the maintenance of UN 
armed forces, because only the Security Council has the power to make 
such assessment; and that the question of suspension of a member"s right 
to vote could only be decided by a two-third vote of the Assembh."' The 
US threatened to apply Article 19. and the Soviet Union indicated that if 
59. UNDOC. A/5847, Rev.l. Jan.29, 1965 and DOCA/587. Feb.3. 1965. 
60. UNDOC. A/5729, Sept. 11, 1964 and A/5431. June.l l . 1963. 
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the sanctions were applied, it would leave the Organization. 
To avoid confrontation over the applicability of Article 19. and in 
the hight of the reluctance of members to apply the sanction of Article 19, 
to those members allegedly two years in arrears, agreement was reached 
among members before the opening of ihe nineteenth session of the General 
Assembly on December 1, 1964. The agreement that the General Assembly 
should conduct its business during the nineteenth session on a no voting' 
basis to avoid a confrontation over the applicability of Article 19. So. a 
voteless session of the Assembly was conducted during which all necessary 
decisions were taken by consensus through informal consultation of the 
President of the Assembly with the delegates. 
By the opening of the twentieth session of the Assembly in 1965. 
the US abandoned its attempts to enforce Article 19. Since it lacked 
support from most members for such extreme sanctions. 
Although there have been no Article 19, cases, since 1965. members 
have withheld assessments and made late payments over the years to such 
an extent that it would appear to have became an informal practice. By the 
end of 1986, 86 UN members owed S 257.8 million of this amount, the 
US owed $ 147 million. South Africa $ 27.6 million: Soviet Union $ 21 
million the Soviet Block $ 18.6 million and 71 others states. S 43.7 
million.*' In addition, members have also withheld dues for peace-keeping 
operations, UN emergency force, UN Disengagement Observer Force 
(UNDOF) and UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 1986. the US 
paid only $ 31.2 million of its required $ 61.7 million for UNDOF and 
61. Margeret E. Galey, Reforming the Regime for Financing the United 
Nations , Howard International Law Journal. (New York). Vol.31(4), 
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UNIFIL. The Soviet owed $ 17.3 million.^- These current withholdings 
reflect serious problems in the UN's ability to collect membership dues 
and raised the question of whether the norm expressed jn Article 19. in 
fact coincides with current expectations of major contributors, pariicularly 
the US in this instance. 
As of 31 January, 1995, total arrears of payment of contributions to 
the assessed budget of the UN were $ 3.6 billion of which $ 1.4 billion 
was against the regular budget and $ 2.2 billion against the peace-keeping. 
Out of the arrears of S 3.6 billion, as much as $ 2.5 billion or 70/{ were 
due from 5 top debtors. 
The arrears are of two types, the first from a large number of very 
poor member contries. Which are unable to pay becuae of their precarious 
ways and means position and whose cumulative defaults of payment 
constitute a very small part of the total arrears and the second from a 
handful of top contributors which capable of making payment but are 
withhelding their contributions as a standing blackmail against the UN. 
And among the top contributors, the US is the biggest defaulter and also 
the most persistent blackmailer. These contributors deliberately hold back 
their dues to compel the UN to reduce their sizes to adjust their agenda 
and alter the thrusts of their activities in order to receive payment of their 
dues. And since a part of the dues is permanently held back, the pressure 
on the UN is to restructure their agenda and activities has become the 
permanent feature of the life of the UN system. 
The US is clearly in default under Article 19, as the amount of its 
arrears far exceeds the amount of its contributions for the preceding two 
02. Ibid. 
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years. The US also can not get a reprieve under the last sentence of this 
Article, because its failure to pay is not due to conditions beyond its 
control. Such condition arises only in the situation of acute economic 
difficulties. The US has never been in such a conditions, as it has never 
claimed that the non-payment of its dues is due to the prevalence of such 
a condition. 
Therefore, there is every justification for the General Assembly to 
suspend the voting rights of the US. But this has never been done on 
account of pragmatic political considerations. Given the overwhelming 
military and economic clout of the US, it is very unlikely that any 
international organization will be able to function effectively without ii^ , 
full participation. Thus the UN is in real dilemma on account of the US 
delinquency. There can be no effective or orderly international system if 
its most powerful member decides to default systematically on its financial 
obligations. 
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^^<z^iten. - 3 
THE UN FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE 
PEACE-KEEPING IN 1950s AND 1960s 
In this chapter an allempl has been made to examine the financing 
of peace and security operations such of UNEF and ONUC. There has 
been no major crisis over the regular budget. The heart of the tension lies 
in the area of peace-keeping. For the first time in history, an international 
organization has created and financed peace-keeping forces as a collective 
responsibility of the world community. The UNEF and ONUC during 
1950s and 1960s have been the most controversial. They have raised 
opposition both on financial and political grounds that deserve a close and 
objective analysis. So does the financing of ONUC which brought the UN 
to the brink of bankruptcy. It also reviews the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ 
on expenses of UN concerning peace-keeping and its impact on the 
financial structure of the UN. The legal role of the General Assembly in 
the field of peace and security operation, the nature of Assembh "s fiscal 
powers and the role of the Court itself in interpreting the Charter have 
been analysed. It also tries to identify the political problems that have 
arisen with regard to UN peace-keeping and to look at the events by which 
these political differences have led to a financial crisis. It examines the 
arrears, defaults and the problems of sanctions, and the various suggestions 
put forwarded for resolving the crisis. Budget appropriations and 
assessment of UN peace-keeping has also been essayed. 
Before analysing the UN peace-keeping role and the financial crisis 
in the 1950s and 1960s, it is essential to discuss briefly here what is 
peace-keeping, observer missions and the peace-making. 
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Peace-Keeping, Observer Mission and Peace-Making 
Defining the Concepts: 
Peace-keeping is that of an operation involving military personnel, 
but without enforcement power, established by the United Nations to help 
maintain or restore peace in areas of conflict. 
UN peace-keeping operation has been conceived as instruments of 
conflict control. Each operation has been established with a specific 
mandate. The UN has used these operations in various conflicts with the 
consent of the parties involved to maintain peaceful condition without • 
prejudice to the positions or claims of parties, in order to facilitate the 
search for political settlements through peaceful means such as mediation 
and the good offices of the Secretary General. UN peace-keeping operations 
fall into two categories, peace-keeping forces and observer missions. 
Peace-keeping forces are composed of contingents of lightly armed 
troops, made available by member states. These forces assist in presenting 
the recurrence of fighting, restoring and maintaining peace and promoting 
a return to normal conditions. To this end peace-keeping forces are 
authorised as necessary to undertake negotiation, persuasion, observation 
and fact finding. They run patrols and interpose phisically between the 
opposing parties. Peace-keeping forces are permitted to use their weapons 
only in self defence. 
Military observer missions are composed of officers (usually 
unarmed) who are made available, on the Secretary-General request, by 
member states. A mission's function is to observe and report to the 
Secretary General (who in turn informs the UN Security Council) on the 
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maintenance of a ceasefire lo investigate violations and to do what it can 
to improve the situation. 
Peace-keeping forces and observer missions must at all times 
maintain complete impartiality and avoid any action that might effect the 
claims or positions of the parties. 
In either form they operate under the same basic principles. They 
are established by the Security Council and exceptionally, by the General 
Assembly, and they are directed by the Secretary General. They must have 
the consent of the host governments and normally also that of the other 
parties directly involved. Military personnel are provided by member states 
on a voluntary basis, military observers are not armed and while the 
soldiers in peace-keeping forces are provided with light defensive weapons. 
they are not authorized to use force except in self-defence. The operations 
must not interfere in the internal affairs of the host country and must not 
be used in any way to favour one party against another in internal conflicts 
effecting member states.' 
Sometimes one confuses the two terms, peace-keeping and peace-
making. Peace-making is the complete range of activities aimed at reduction 
of conflicts among nation states. It includes from resorting to all forms if 
pacific means of settlement (arbitration, negotiation, conciliation etc) to 
activities specifi-cally designed to stop open hostilities among belligerents. 
Peace-keeping on the other hand, is more technical in nature and is being 
operated on the political will of the UN (Particularly the Secretary-General 
and Security Council) and the participating countries.-
1. Everyone's United Nations, 10th edn., (New York, 1986), PP,97-99. 
2. Ibid, PP. 37-38. 
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Peace-keeping operations must also have a broad political consensus 
among member states. The most important element in that consensus is the 
Security Council, whose continuing support is essential. Also fundamental 
is the need for the continuing support not only of the countries or parties 
principally concerned in the conflict, but also of the states contributing 
troops. Besides support, there must be co-operation. Since the peace- . 
keepers have little or no capacity for enforcement and their use of force 
is limited to self- defence.^ 
The UN peace-keeping budget is also based on assessment, though 
the formula applied for making the assessment of the contributions of 
member stales is slightly different from that applied to the assessments for 
the regular budget. According to the formula approved by the General 
Assembly in 1973, each of the five permanent members of the Security 
Council pay 22 percent more than their share under the regular budget 
assessment criteria, a second group of countries pays the same as in the 
regular budget formula, a third group of countries pays one-fifth of its 
regular assessment, and the fourth group pays one-tenth.^ 
For any peace-keeping men, money and materials are required, but 
the financing patterns differed widely. The Korean enforcement action was 
heavily dependent from beginning to an and on the US and uas nexer 
budgeted through the UN. The establishment of UN Emergencx Force 
(UNEF) in 1956 marked the first time that the General Assembl> assessed 
the costs of a major peace-keeping operation on the entire membership. 
This was a milestone for the Organization. So does the financing of the 
3. Ibid, P. 98. 
4. Muckund Dubey, Financing the United Nations , in M.S. Rajan (Fd.), 
UN at Fifty and Beyond, (New Delhi, 1995) PP.269-70. 
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UN operation in the Congo (ONUC), which turned the UN inio house 
divided and brought it to the brink of bankruptcy. On the other hand, the 
numerious UN 'Presence' and 'Observers' as well as the UN Temporary 
Executive Authority in west New Guinea and the mission to Yemen and 
others were financed in relatively simple manner. The main thrust of this 
analysis is on UNEF and ONUC. 
United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF): 
The establishment of the UN emergency force in 1956. was a 
political and military milestone of the UN. For the first lime an 
international force not dominated by a single power was constituted. 
It also represented a fiscal milestone in the life ot the UN. For the 
first time an international body decided that the costs of such an 
international force should be shared by the nations of the world community. 
The father of UNEF was Lester Pearson of Canada. When on 
November 2, 1956. the General Assembly was locked in debate o\er the 
British-French-Israeli action in Suez. Pearson proposed that peace and 
security be restored through a UN. Since the situation directly inxolved 
two of the permanent members of the Security Council, France and 
England, and indirectly concerned two other, the US and the erstwhile 
Soviet Union, the effective action by the Security Council was impossible. 
As a result, the General Assembly chose to take action through a resolution 
creating UNEF, which was passed by a vote of 64 in favour. 0 against and 
12 abstention.^ 
5. G.A. Res. 1000. ES-/UN.GAOR. Supp (No-1) 2, UN DOC. A/3354 
(1956). 
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So, when the first UN peace-keeping force was established in 1956 
the arrangement for financing it, like every thing else connected with the 
force had to be improvised. Because there was no provision in the Charter 
for peace-keeping, there was no guidance about the way such forces should 
be paid for. The Charter did not even define how the type of security force 
it did provide for, to undertake enforcement action under Article 42-48 
should be financed. Either special adhoc arrangements would have to be 
made, or it would be assumed that the costs represented normal running 
expenses of the Organization, and would be undertaken by all member 
states through their regular contributions. 
In his report on the detailed arrangements for that force of 6 
November, 1956, the Secretary General Hammarskjold proposed that the 
basic costs of equipment and salaries for each contingent should be borne 
by the state contributing it, but that other costs should be financed by the 
UN through outside the normal budget, that is through a special account 
into which members were to pay their required assessment, on the basis 
of the scale of assessments to be adopted for the 1957 budget. In addition, 
he suggested an initial appropriation of SIO million to meet the immediate 
cash needs. The Secretary-General preferred it to inclusion of UNEF 
expenditures in the regular budget because he wanted funds for the force 
immediately. The latter course would almost certainly have resulted in 
serious delay. This technique was successful, and the General Assembly 
established the special account of SIO million on November, 26 as an 
interim measure.^ 
After an exhaustive debate, almost all of the Secretary-General 
6. John G. Stoessinger, Financing the United Nations System, (Washington 
D.C., 1964) P.107. 
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proposal was included in the Fifth Committee's draft resolution, adopted 
by the General Assembly by a vote of 62 in favour, 8 against, and 7 
abstentions. By this resolution, the Assembly decided, ' 
...that the expenses of the UN Emergency Force other than for such 
pay, equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished without 
charge by Governments of Member States, shall be borne by the UN 
and shall be apportioned among the Member States, to the extent of 
$10 million, in accordance with the scale of assessments adopted by 
the General Assembly for contributions to the annual budget of the 
Organization for the financial year 1957 ... that this decision shall 
be without prejudice to the subsequent apportionment of any 
expenses in excess of $10 million which may be incurred in 
connection with the force.^ 
The former Soviet Union and a number of smaller countries'* refused 
to contribute claiming that the General Assembly was not authorize to 
create the force and that the expenses for maintaining the force were not 
expenses of the Organization under Article 17(2) of the UN Charter.'^ She 
claimed that under the Charter the Security Council had the primary 
responsibility for questions of peace and security, this meant that the 
Security Council alone could set up any force which had the role of 
keeping the force. This was for the former Soviet Union a vitally important 
point of principle. To accept the right of the Assembly to establish a force 
would mean that she accepted that such a force could be created to operate 
l'. G.A. Res, 1089(XI), Dec. 21, 1956. 
8. Among the Nations owing assessments for 1960 were: Afganistan, 
Albania, Argentina. Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Chile. China, 
Columbia. CostaRica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Elsalvador, Ethiopia, 
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Iraq, .lordan, 
Labanan, Liberia, Libya, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan. Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru. Philippines, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia. Spain, 
Sudan, Ukraine. USSR, UAR, Uruguay, Venezuela. 
John Robert Cotton. Financing Peace-keeping Trouble Again Cornell • 
International law of .lournal Vol. 78, P. 109. 
9. Ibid. 
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against her will, and even directly could be created to operate against 
herself. On these grounds, the former Soviet Union declared thai she 
would refuse any responsibility for sharing in its costs, including the direct 
costs. They were not in her view part of the normal expenses of the 
Organization to which every member state must contribute. The cost of the 
force should be undertaken by the aggressor state, that is in the case of 
the Suez crisis, by Isreal. Britian and France.'" 
The erstwhile Soviet Union was not alone in its reluctance to pay. 
A number of Arab countries objected to pay for an operation made 
necessary by an attack on another Arab states. Other states mainly Latin 
American countries, objected for another reason. They were not concerned 
that the Assembly, rather than the Security Council had authorized ihe 
force. It was rather that under the Charter the Security Council and 
specially the permanent members had been given the main responsibility 
for the maintenance of peace and security. This meant that the permanent 
members were also, in their view, the states which should bear the financial 
burden. It was wrong to place responsibility for finding the mone\ on poor 
countries which found it hard enough to pay even their normal 
contributions. They therefore, demanded that arrangements should be made 
for allocating the cost of the force which place the major burden on the 
permanent members." 
In October, 1957 Hammrskjold reported once more to the General 
Assembly on the arrangements for the peace. He suggested a slight change 
in the principle laid down for reimbursing the countries who pro\ ided the 
10.Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations. Volume-2. The Age of 
Decolonization, 1955-65, (London, 1993) P.444. 
11.Ibid. 
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contingents. The general principle to be applied was that the contributing 
governments would continue to undertake all the costs that thc\ would 
anyway have incurred through the existence of the contingents, but that any 
additional expenses including transport costs, subsistence allowances. 
additional costs for recreation and a special allowance for serving with the 
force would be payable by the UN. Special arrangements would also have 
to be made to cover volunteer contingents, specially recruited for service 
with the UN. Since these loo would represent an additional expense, their 
costs also would be borne by the Organization. Similarly, when a UN 
soldier died or was killed in service, the Organization would accept 
responsibility for reimbursing any benefits that were payable to the next of 
kin.'-
In Nov, 1956 the Assembly authorized the Secretary General to 
spend upto $10 million in establishing the force. In each succeeding year 
the General Assembly assessed the largest share of UNEF expenditures in 
a similar manner. $15 million in 1957, $25 million in 1958. and S15 in 
1959. Each year the General Assembly went through lengthy debates before 
arriving at this decision. In 1960. because of pressure from the Latin 
American and newly admitted nations, the pattern was changed. The 
Assembly decided to reduce the financial burden of those goxernments 
having the least capacity to pay applying voluntary contributions pledged 
prior to December 31. 1959 as a credit to reduce by 50 percent the 
contribution of as many governments as possible, commencing w ith those 
assessed at the minimum of 0.04 percent, the net result of this change was 
tlie United States and the United Kingdom, the two largest \oluntary 
contributors, assumed some of the burden of the smaller nations. The 1960 
12. Ibid, P.445. 
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assessment under the new rule $20 million and those for the next three 
years were kept around the $19 million mark. The amounts varied from 
year to year because some government notably the US and Canada, decided 
to forego their rights to reimbursement for special services such as airlifts 
and other means of transportation.'^ 
The decision to assess the member states did not solve the problem 
of financing UNEF. The heart of the problem was how to close the gap 
between assessment and collection. Each year arrears and defaults 
amounted to roughly one-third of the total assessment. Since voluntary 
contributions were less than 20 percent of the annual cost of operations. 
UNEF ran a serious annual deficit and had to draw heavily on the working 
capital fund.'" 
The United Nations Congo Operation (ONUC): 
This was the situation when in June, 1960. the second UN peace-
keeping force in the Congo (ONUC)''' was set up by the Securit\ Council 
rather than the General Assembly to aid in restoring law and order due to 
civil war in the Congo (now named Zaire) at the request of the central 
government. This enormously added to the financial problems already 
being experienced by the Organization. The force established there was 
about three times the size of that used in Sinai. While the cost of UNEF 
was at its highest only about half that of the regular budget, but that of 
the Congo force was alone, much bigger than the regular budget. While 
in early 1960s UNEF was costing under $20 million a year, ONUC in 
13. Stoessinger. n.6. PP. 109-110. 
14. Ibid. 
15. The abbreviation ONUC is taken from the French: Organization des 
Nations Unis Congo. 
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1962 alone cost $120 million. The result was that by that time the two 
forces together cost twice as much as the regular budget. In other words 
they had tripled the total expenses of the Organiztion."' 
Though ONUC was much bigger than UNEF. there was a difference 
in the way in which it was established which it was believed by some. 
might reduce the financial problem it created. The forte was authorized in 
the first place by the Security Council rather than the General Assembly. 
Secondly the erstwhile Soviet Union had voted in favour of the resolution 
under which the force was created. Neither of these facts, however, reduced 
the objections of the erstwhile Soviet Union for paying for the force. When 
the General Assembly attempted to fund the force through normal 
apportionments to all member states, the erstwhile Soviet Union and 
France, along with thirteen other states, refused to pay their assessed 
shares. The recalcitrant states argued that the Charter gave the Security 
Council the exclusive power to act in peace keeping matters and that the 
General Assemblx could assess only "regular' or administrative evpenses 
of the Organization under Article 17(2). The issue become highh contested 
and that over sixty nations were in arrears on required payments.'" 
The French position was very interesting. They argue that members 
of the UN can be bound only by decisions of the Security Council under 
chapter VII and that recommendation by either the Security Council or 
General Assembly, cannot give rise to binding financial obligations. She 
held that the establishment of a peace-keeping was an extraordinary activity 
of the Organization for which special financing arrangements would have 
to be made. She therefore, held that the costs of the force should be 
16. Luard. n.lO. P.446. 
17. Ibid. 
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undertaken only on a voluntary basis by those states which supported its 
activities.'" 
The former Soviet Union presents a rather different case. UNEF she 
views as illegal having been setup by the General Assembly and not by the 
Security Council. As for ONUC, although it was setup by the Security 
Council, the former Soviet Union thinks that the Security Council, and not 
the Assembly, should have made the necessary financial arrangements 
under Artile 43. She also views the role of the Secretary General in the 
Congo operations as improper in several respects and as vittating her 
obligation to contribute. Above all, the former Soviet Union and France, 
have argued that the power of the General Assembly under Article 17 to 
consider and approve the budget refers only to the regular administrative 
budget and not to 'extraord-inary' peace-keeping costs raised under separate 
account.'^ 
The Soviet position was based on a strict interpretation of Article 
24 and 43 of the Charter. Artile 24 confers on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.-° The Soviet Union interpret Primary in the hierarchical sense 
and concluded that the provision gives exclusive jurisdiction over security 
18. Rosalyn Higgins, United Nations Peace-keeping Political and 
Financial Problems , The world Today (London) Vol.27, No-8. 1965, 
P. 326. 
19. Ibid. 
20. UN Charter Art 24. Para 1, 
Article 24(1) Provides that In order to ensure prompt and effective 
action by the United Nations, its member confer on the Security Council 
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
security, and agree that in carrying out its duties, under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf . 
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matters to the Security Council. In support of this view they cited Artile 
11(2) which authorizes the General Assembly to make recommendations 
on questions related to the maintenance of international peace and security, 
as requiring the General Assembly to refer the question to the Security 
Council whenever action is necessary.-' In addition, the Soviet Union read 
Article 43 as bestowing on the Security Council the exclusive right to 
negotiate agreements for the creation, maintenance and financing of peace-
keeping forces.--
The costs of ONUC were as first like those of UNEF. met by 
authorizing the Secretary-General to make special expenditures beyond the 
21. UN Charter Artile 11(2) 
Provides that The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating 
to the maintenance of international peace and security brought before 
it by any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council 
or by a state which is not a member of the United Nations in accordance 
with Article 35. paragraph 2 and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state 
or states concerned or to the Security Council or both any such question 
on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council 
by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. 
22.UN Charter - Art 43 
1. All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the 
maintenance of international peace and security undertake to make 
available to the Security Council on its call and in accordance with a 
special agreements, armed forces assistance, and facility, including right 
of passage necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace 
and security. 
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the members and types 
of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature 
of the facilities and assistance to be provided. 
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible 
on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded 
between the Security Coucil and members between the Securit> Council 
and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional 
process. 
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normal budget. In July, 1960 the Advisory Committee on Administrative 
and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), (the committee which advised the 
Secretary-General and the Organization generally, about financial 
questions), authorized the Secretary-General to spend upto $15 million on 
the new force. In September, the amount was raised to $40 million and 
again it was raised to $50 million at the end of the year. At the same time 
the Assembly explicidy declared that the expenses of the operation' 
represented "expenses of the Organization' within the meaning of Article 
17 that is normal expenses, which were to be borne by the member states 
and apportioned by the General Assembly, and it decided that the assessed 
costs of $48.5 million for 1960 should be apportioned among member 
states on the basis of the regular scale of assessments. In April of the 
following year the Assembly authorized expenditure of $100 million for 
the period January-October. In later authorized expenditure of S80 million 
for the period 1 November to 30th June 1962.-^ 
These were very large sums. Some members were refusing lo pay 
their share of the assessed costs and the Organization was therefore facing 
large deficit. In April 1961 the Assembly called on all members to make 
voluntary contributions to help meet the deficit, and it particularl\ called 
on the permanent members to make seizable additional contribution. In 
December of that year, because of the protests from the developing 
countries at the increased burden the two peace-keeping forces were 
creating, it introduced a special scale of contributions, reducing by 80 
percent the amount to be paid by the poorest member-states, and by 50 
percent the contributions of the middle income states. In June of the 
following year, this small proportion of the amount used was to be paid 
23. Luard, n.lO, P.447. 
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according to the normal scale of assessment, and the rest under a new 
sliding scale which reduced the burden on poorer countries. At the same 
lime a new effort was made to secure voluntary contributions, in cash or 
in kind, from the better of member states.^^ 
In order to obtain a full picture of ONUC support, a word must be 
added about voluntary contributions of men, money and materials. Between 
1960 and 1964. twenty-nine nations contributed troops, the average strength 
of the force during that period was around 16,000 men. The contingents 
were either raised through volunteers, or when regular army personnel 
were sent, these were not replaced at home. But the Congo force, unlike ' 
its predecessor in the Middle East, suffered considerable casualties in the 
performance of its peace-keeping functions.'* 
The only nation that made voluntary contributions in cash to the 
Congo operation was the US. The amounts between 1960 and 1962 came 
to over S30.6 million and were used to cover the deficits created through 
rebates permitted the poorer nations. In addition, four governments waived 
over $12.7 million in reimbursement claims on initial airlift and 
transportation services in 1960. These waiver were made by the US. the 
former Soviet Union. Canada, and the United Kingdom in amounts of 
approximately $10.3 million. $1.5 million, $650,000 million and $520 • 
million respectively. Several government again provided some nonessential 
and therefore nonreimbursable goods and services to the troops and 
incurred modest overhead administrative expenses in connection with the 
force.-^ 
24. Ibid, P. 448. 
25. Stoessinger, n.6, PP. 113-121. 
26. Ibid. 
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The total picture of ONUC support give some interesting 
comparisons with UNEF. First, all nations with troops in UNEF in 1962 
were also paid up on their assessments. Of the seventeen nations with 
troops or personnel in ONUC in 1962, all but Austria, Brazil, and Ethiopia' 
were fully paid up. Second, voluntary contributions to ONUC were less 
generous than to UNEF. Only the US contributed, the amount was roughly 
13 percent of the total cost upto 1962. Once again, India supplied the 
greatest amount of manpower and the US the greatest amount of money 
and materials. While arrears and defaults by member states on their 
assessments to UNEF were a serious irritation to the UN. the> never 
constimted a mortal threat. In the case of the Congo force, on the other 
hand, arrears and defaults by late 1961 had shaken the financial structure 
of the Organization to its foundation.-' 
Arrears, Defaults and the Problem of Sanctions: 
At the time of the opening of the Sixteenth General Assembly, 
UNEF and ONUC arrears had brought the UN close to bankruptcy. In the 
case of UNEF, forty one members owed all or part of their assessments 
for the 1960 budget, bringing arrears to almost 25 percent and sixty five 
members owed all or part of their 1961 assessments bringing the combined 
shortage to almost 30 percent of the total for the two years. With ONUC, 
sixty six members had accumulated a combined shortage of almost 40 
percent of the 1960 budget and only twenty four had paid their 1961 
assessments.^ Two of the five permanent powers of the Security Council, 
27. Terence Higgins, The Politics of United Nations Finance . The world 
Today. (London) Vol-19, No.9, 1963, PP.383-84. 
28. These were: Australia, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, 
Dahomey, Denmark, Finland, Gabon, Iceland, India, Ireland. Lvory 
coast, Japan, Liberria. Malaya, The Netherland, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
Norway, Pakistan, Tanisia, Turkev United Kingdom and United States. 
the erstwhile Soviet Union and France had declared their intention not to 
make payment, and a third. China, had defauhed. 
The defaulting nations could be grouped into two broad catcgores. 
First, there were those, like the erstwhile Soviet Union and France, which 
refused to recognize their obligation to pay under an Assembly resolution. 
Most of the Latin American nations, arguing that peace-keeping operations 
should be viewed as extraordinary expenses and should not be apportioned 
within the meaning of Article 17 of the Charter. Second, a number of 
nations, mostly newly admitted members, recognized their legal obligation 
but. owing to the large expenses involved, had fallen seriously in arrears. 
As a result, the two peace-keeping operations had become heavily 
dependent on one great power, the US. Although the US was assessed less 
than one-third of the 1961 UNEF budget, but since its \oluntary 
comribution was used to offset the reductions granted to fifty-one countries 
with a limited capacity to pay. it was paying 43 percent of the total. In 
1962. these reduction were increased and the US assumed responsibility 
for a portion of the essessment of seventy nine member states, which 
brought its share of the total cost to 48 percent. In the case of ONUC. the 
US had assumed this large share from the beginning.-'' 
In the light of this situation, to close the gap between assessment 
and payment, the only legal sanction provided by the Charter was Article 
19, the relevance of which was clear by the ICJ Advisory Opinion m July 
1962. But this Article was never invoke. 
Even before the ICJ Opinion declared UNEF and ONUC costs 
expenses of the Organization there were strong arguments in favour of 
29. Stoessinger, n.6, P. 122. 
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invoking Article 19. First, the Assembly had assessed part of the costs of 
the Congo force as binding legal obligations . Not to invoke any sanction 
would be to make a mockery of the Charter. Second, defaulting states, if 
confronted with the threat of Article 19, might pay their assessments in 
order to avoid adverse publicity. Even the erstwhile Soviet Union might 
decide that its vote in the Assembly was of greater value than its 
intransigent attitude on the Congo force. And, the African, Latin American, 
Asian, and Middle Eastern nations might also be prompted to honour their 
obligations. 
On the other hand, there was a case to be made against the use of" 
Article 19. The heart of the Soviet contention was that the Assembly did 
not have the power to impose binding legal obligations in matters affecting 
peace and security. Many of the small countries had argued that a majority 
of the Assembly could not impose its will on minority, even in financial 
matters. A number of the nations that had taken this position would be in 
arrears when the time came to apply Article 19. The former Soviet Union 
and other defaulting nations might even decided to withdraw from the 
Organization. Indeed, the use of Article 19 might wreck the UN by 
depleting its membership. This danger made the application of the Charter 
a formidable problem.^" 
The Assembly, on December 20, 1961, it decided, by a vote of 52 
to 11, with 32 abstentions, to clear up the legal controversy by asking the 
International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the question: Did 
the expanditures authorized by the General Assembly for UNEF and ONUC 
constitute expenses of the Organization within the meaning of Article 17 
30. Ibid, PP. 122-123. 
72 
of the Charter? Since a great number of nations were in arrears at the time 
and an affirmative Court opinion might bring into play Article 1^. 
The majority view was expressed by the delegate from Australia, 
who stated that the problem of financing the peace-keeping operations was 
primarily a political rather than a legal one and would not be solved by 
a Court opinion. On the other hand the opposition was led by former 
Soviet Union, which declared that the problem was purely political and 
outside the competence of the ICJ. All members from the Soviet bloc 
stated that they would not consider themselves bound by the opinion. 
Aside from Soviet bloc, only France voted against the resolution. The high 
number of abstentions betrayed a considerable degree of ambivalence. 
So, the imposition of sanctions emerged as a highly sensitive matter, 
which was more a political rather than a legal problem. The tendency of 
many states to vote for a peace-keeping operation and not to pa\ for it 
could probably not be arrested entirely through legal means." 
In December 20, 1961, the Assembly authorized the Secretary 
General to issue Bonds of up to $200 million at 2 percent interest with 
amortization to be charged on the regular budget. France and former 
Soviet Union refused to pay the amortization charges on the regular budget 
and former Soviet Union further indicated that she would refuse to pay 
other peace-keeping items on the regular budget, such as the UN Truce 
Supervision Organization in Palestine and the Military Observer Group in 
Kashmir. ^ ^ 
None of these measures overcome the basic problem, which resulted 
31. Ibid, PP. 123-124. 
32. Higgins, n.27, P.385. 
from the refusal of a member states, including two permanent members 
and of the East European countries to pay their share of the costs for 
UNEF and ONUC, caused a rapid deterioration in the financial position. 
In 1961 no assessment was made. The declaration which the Assembly had 
made in December 1960 that peace-keeping costs represented normal 
expenses of the Organization had not effected the willingness of such 
member state to pay up. 
In 1973. a new formula for peace-keeping operations was approved 
by the General Assembly. According to this formula, each of the five 
permanent members of the Security Council pay 22 percent more than 
their share under the regular budget assessment criteria, a second group 
of countries pays the same as in the regular budget formula, a third group 
of countries pays one-fifth of its regular assessment and a fourth group 
pays one tenth." 
According to this formula, the US is to pay 31.7 percent of the 
peace-keeping budget. The major contributors have defaulted on the 
payment of their contributions to the peace-keeping budget. They are also 
complaining that the UN is taking too many peace-keeping operations. 
There are political reason too, the most important of them being the desire 
of the major military powers to action their own without involving the UN 
or just getting the stamp of UN, approval for their acting on their own in 
situations of threat to or breach of peace. As a combined result of both 
these economic and political factors, the UN is now reduced to a mere 
residual role in peace-keeping, and the peace-keeping operations the UN 
is permitted to carry out, face uncertainty of resources and frequently run 
33. Dubey, n.4, PP. 269-270. 
into problems. Owing to the arrears of the payment of the assessed shares 
countries contributing troops has experienced up to 5 years of delay in the 
reimbursement of their costs.^'' 
When the UN was engaged in controversial and expenses peace-
keeping operations, no one was expecting that the Organization would end 
with a bang. There did exist a real possibility that it might have ended with 
a whimper. A fiscal crisis which was started in 1960 became a threat to 
the very life of the Organization. The heart of the crisis in the field of 
peace and security was not because of inability to finance but because of 
unwillingness of some slates to support politically controversial operations. 
The central issue was, and still remain, that of political consensus. 
Consensus has not been an outstanding feature of UN peace and security 
operations. In Korea, there was military conflict, in the Congo, active 
political obstraction by a major power, in the Middle East passive 
opposition, in a number of minor actions, grudging assentment. 
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice: 
The General Assembly, on December 20, 1961, requested the ICJ 
to give an advisory opinion, it asked for guidance on the following 
question: 
...Do the expenditures authorized in General Assembly resolutions... 
relating to the UN operations in the Congo.... and to the operations 
of the UN Emergency force.... constitute expenses of the 
Organizations within the meaning of Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the 
Charter of the UN?" 
34. Ibid. 
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The ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion in July 1962, found by nine 
vote to five, in a fascinating opinion that UNEF and O.NUC were legally 
established and that the costs incurred were indeed expenses of the 
Organization under Article 17 because peace-keeping was a function falling 
within the legitimate purposes of the UN and therefore creating binding 
financial obligations for the Organization. The Court thought that it was 
a denial of one of the main purposes of the UN to assume that expenses' 
in Article 17 meant only ordinary, administrative expenses, it must mean 
peace-keeping expenses too. It found that there was no distinction between 
administrative and operational expenses of the Organization. The expenses 
of the Congo force aad been undertaken in pursuit of one of the basic 
purposes of the Organization, the maintenance of peace and securiiN. Since 
the action of the Secretary-General in establishing the force had been in 
compliance with a resolution of the Security Council, and had been 
endorsed by subsequent resolution, he had not usurped the right of Security 
Council in doing so. Therefore tlie expenses of the peace-keeping operation 
could properly be regarded as expenses of the Organization within the 
meaning of Article 17. This opinion was endorsed by the General Assembly 
when it met later that year by the large majority, seventy six in favour, 
seventeen against and eight abstention.^^ 
However, the opinion was only an advisory one and was not binding 
on the Organization. Though it slightly increased the pressure on non-
paying states to pay up. it did not settle the matter. The former Soviet 
Union, France and other countries still refused to pay. It was therefore 
36.James Fergusson Hogg Peace-keeping Costs and the Charter Obligation 
Implications of the International Court of Justice Decision on Certain 
Expenses of the United Nations , Columbia law Review (New York) 
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decided at the General Assembly session of 1962 to set up a Working 
Group of twenty one members to examine the problem, This was asked to 
look at the question of the arrears due from some members and to 
recommend ways by which these might be paid off, while taking account 
of the economic circumstances of each state. It was also decided lo hold 
a special session of the Assembly in June, 1963 to consider the group's 
report. 
The Working Group, sought the views of individual member states. 
But, because of divisions within the Working Group itself, it reached no 
conclusions by the time of the special session. The special session uas also 
not able to reach a final solution, and for the same reason it set out some 
general principles which should govern a solution. For example, it declared 
that the financing of Peace-keeping operations was the collective 
responsibility of all members, that developed countries were in a position 
to make a relatively large contribution thar the less developed, that efforts 
should be made to encourage voluntary contributions. That the special 
responsibility of the permanent members should be borne in mind in 
considering their contribution for financing peace and security operations. 
and that special consideration should be given to the situtation of any 
member which was a victim of or involved in the actions leading to a 
peace-keeping operation. The Assembly also appealed to the countries in 
arrears and asked the Secretary General to work out with them special 
arrangement to pay. It authorized the Secretary General to continue to sell 
UN bonds until December 1964 and consult about the establisliment of a 
peace fund, financed by voluntary contributions. Finally it asked the 
Working Group to continue its work and try to devise a permanent solution 
by the time of the 1964 Assembly." 
The working group met for a further year, but it was still not able 
to come up with any agreed solution. There was among its own members, 
as among the membership of the Organization as a whole, a diametrical 
difference of opinion between those that were convinced that contribution 
towards peace-keeping forces were, as the ICJ had advised normal expenses 
of the Organization, to which every member state must be expected to 
contribute, and those which took the opposite view point that they are 
special operations for which special financial arrangements must be made, 
to which no state could be compelled to contribute against it will. By the 
summer of 1964 there was no improvement in the situation and the peace-
keeping deficit had increased to $112 million, despite special receipts of 
S50 million from the sale of UN bonds and from voluntary contribution 
by the governments. The Secretary General in his annual report for that 
year, in which the financial crisis was the major theme. He set out the 
basic facts of the situation the Organization faced and urged the need for 
a solution. He said that the experience of the last three years had convinced 
him that a policy of adhoc solutions, which in practice relied on the 
generosity of the few rather than the collective responsibility of all could 
not endure. 
The same view was taken by a number of member state. The US, 
came to the view that the issue of the unpaid contributions was the cause 
of the Organizations defecit. The deficits in the contributions of those 
countries refusing to pay had over the years steadily mounted. Under 
Article 19 of the Charter it was laid down that a member state shall have 
37. Luard, n.lO, PP.449-450. 
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no vole in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears equal or 
exceeds the amount of contributions due from it for the preceeding two full 
years. The US administration came to the view that the only vvay of 
bringing the issue to a head and compelling the defaulting states to pay 
their share was by pressing for this provision of the Charter to be applied 
against them.-^ *^  
Before the beginning of the Nineteenth Assembly in 1964 the former 
Soviet Union and a number of East European countries had accumulated 
more than two years of arrears, and the terms of Article 19 were liable 
to be deprived of their vote. The Soviet Union threatened that she would 
walked out of the UN if deprived of her vote. So, a very strange situation 
was arises which has threaten the very existence of the UN. Ultimately an 
arrangement was made which was undignified but perhaps necessary 
procedure whereby no formal voting was taken place. By this manner of 
operation the scope of the Assembly work was pathetically limited. By 
which time France also was two year in arrears. The Assembly asked the 
President of the Assembly to convene a new committee to look all aspects 
of the problem and to report to the Assembly by 15 June, 1964. The 
Assembly was to reconvene on 1st September in which thirty-three nations 
for the committee was selected by the President. This committee presented 
an interim report in June which reveals an inability of its members to come 
to any specific agreement.^'' 
It is not easy to avaluate the impact of the advisory opinion on the 
financal structure of the UN. The Court has confirmed the Assembly's role 
38. Ibid, PP. 450-51. 
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in peace-keeping activities and has also underwritten its authority to impose 
legally building assessments on the member states. This means that in 
financing peace-keeping activities, a two third majority of the General 
Assembly may bind the entire membership, including those states that vote 
against. In that sense, the opinion signifies a tentative step toward the 
principle of international taxation of states by the world community. .More 
broadly, it leads support to the principle of majority rule in international 
relations. The Court also gave the Assembly or the Security Council free 
reign to establish other noncoercive force in the future and to arrange for 
their financial support, provided they are in accord with the purposes of 
the UN. On the whole the Court gave its approval to Dag Hammarskjold's 
conception of the UN as a dynamic instrument capable of executive 
action toward increasingly effective forms of active international 
cooperation , as against the notion of the Organization as a mere static 
conference machinery ."" 
The practical effect of the opinion on the finance (treasury) of the 
UN is not likely to be too significant. Although the Seventeenth General 
Assembly decided to accept the opinion by a large majority of 76 in 
favour, 17 against, with 8 abstention, while Sixteenth had requested it by 
a vote of only 52 infavour, 16 against with 32 abstenations, the politically 
motivated delinquents have not been eager to abide by the opinion. 
Although a considerable number of other nations in arrears were guided 
by the opinion and clear their dues. But their payments amounted to only 
a small parts of the unpaid assessments."' 
The opinion also makes it possible for the Assembly to invoke 
40. Stoessinger. n.6, P-153. 
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sanctions if il chooses lo do so. Tiie Court has not pronounced on this 
matter, and there is no precedent for sanctions in the UN. The heart of 
the problem of sanctions is not legal but political. To ignore the possibility 
of invoking Article 19 altogether would be to ignore the implications of the 
advisory opinion, but to insist on sanctions might lead to departure of 
disgruntled states from the UN. On balance, if Article 19 has to be 
invoked it should be made clear that the thrust of the sanction is not 
against a given state, but for the law of the Charter. 
The political import of the opinion was reflected in each of ten 
different statements. All the judges labored under the difficulty of applying 
legal tools to what was also a controversial political issue. It is true that 
the Assembly asked the court a legal question, but it is equalh true that 
its request for an advisory opinion was also an attempt to exert pressure 
on a stubborn minority. It is probably not an accident that all the judges 
except Badawi of United Arab Republic took voting positions that were 
suitable with those of their national government. 
In its broadest form, the issue may be described as that of majority 
rule versus state sovereignty. The advisory opinion advanced the cause of 
former and by so doing affirmed the power of the General AssembK. It 
in effect reversed the stand taken by the Permanent Court of Internatu nal 
Justice (PCIJ) in 1927 in the Lotus case, which has asserted the principle 
that limitations on the sovereignty of states cannot be presumed. \\ iih its 
implicaiton that what is not explicitly surrendered by states is retained.^-
This great power of the Assembly may be used constructively and with a 
sense of fiscal responsibility. Majority rule per se does not guarantee 
42. Ibid, P. 154. 
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progress toward order in the relations of states. Nor will the advisory 
opinion clear the way for definitive solution of the financial crisis. But it' 
may be as important building block if the Assembly chooses to huild on 
it with wisdom, prudence and imagination. 
Financing Peace-Keeping: Suggestions and Options: 
The major issue under this head is in which organ financial authority 
shall lie in the future. Couple with this is the issue of who should pa\ The 
former Soviet Union in the committee of thirty-three has said that only the 
Security Council may authorize expenditure on peace-keeping and second 
that the aggressor shall bear financial responsibility for any international 
action taken against him. Even if this were an acceptable suggestion for 
UN enforcement action, it does not meet the point that in policing 
operations such as those in Cyprus and Congo, the UN has been at pain 
not to designate an aggressor, but rather to act upon the request of the 
parties. The former Soviet Union does concede, though not in very precise 
terms that there may be situations which require UN members to take part 
in defraying such expenditure, and she has indicated that if the Security 
Council in future both establishes the forces and adopts the decisions on 
finance, she will contribute. As she has a veto in the Security Council and 
if she decide not veto a decision on the establishment and payment of a 
UN force, then she will pay for it. 
Maxico has suggested that the General Assembly could recommend 
the initiation of peace-keeping force to the Security Council, with the 
consent of the states parties to the dispute. The Assembly would consider 
and approve the financial arrangements, which it would then recommend 
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to the Security Council. The aim is to harmonize the work ot the two 
organs. Equally, if the Security Council decided to initiate a policing 
operation, it would send reports to on this to the Assembly together with 
recommendations for finance. The General Assembly would have the power 
to accept the recommendations on finance or to refer them back for further, 
consideration.'*^ 
Other states in the commitee of thirty three urged that the General 
Assembly should continue to apportion expenses for peace-keeping, but 
that, in so doing it should take into account any strong political objectio-
ns which had been voiced by a permanent member. Other nations such as 
India, see this as discriminatory for its result would be to allow the most 
powerful states to opt out of payment, while all other UN members would 
have to pay, whether or not they had voiced objections. 
Various other suggestions are being made both inside and outside 
the UN. It has been suggested for example, that a peace fund on which 
the UN could draw should be raised by means of bonds which individuals 
and institutions as well as government, could buy. But it was not accepted 
by any of the big five because of their political differences. It is necessary 
to sidestep on the political differences which underlie the financial 
deadlock, and only when these are resolved can real progress be made 
upon new techniques for fund raising."" 
Peace-keeping by consent following the prec-edents of Yemen and 
west Irian, where only the parties to the dispute were asked to pay may 
be more acceptable politically. But this method in effect acknowledges a 
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minimal future role for the UN. It would hardly, for example, do in a 
future Congo situation. 
U.N. peace-keeping by voluntary payments this has also been 
forcefully propounded by Mexico in the committee of thirty-three. It is 
suggested that the UN action should be paid for solely by those voting in 
favour of it. This would, ofcourse, entail a complete move away from the 
collective financial responsibility. There are certain disadvantages to this 
suggestion. Small countries with no particular interest at stake, believing 
that one or more of the great powers will decline to pay, will be reluctant 
to carry any part of the ensuing financial burden, and will tend not to vote 
in favour of peace-keeping in some far-off part of the globe. Although in 
the short run the US and her allies could with Afro-Asian support, finance 
a UN operation, such a technique could all too quickly become suspect 
among the non-aligned nations as western imperialism. Voluntary 
contribmions are also volatile, uncertain and unpredictable. A sudden 
decline in voluntary contributions results in a large scale retrenchment of 
their personnel and activities. There is thus no immediate apparent solution. 
But the UN desperately needs money to meet its day-to-day expenses and 
it equally desperately needs goodwill. 
One immediate possible solution to the problem is action against the 
member in arrears under Article 19 of the Charter. This Article calls for 
the loss of voting rights in the General Assembly when the amount in 
arrears equals the contributions due from the member for the preceeding 
two years. This is undoubtedly the strongest sanction available and its 
implimentation would certainly discourage some countries from falling 
behind in payment, but its use against a powerful country such as the US 
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is impractical. The loss oi" a veto in the Assembly would have little effect 
on a permanent member of the Security Council since the member would 
still retain its veto power in that organ. Further, while, it would lose its 
own vote, the effect of a big power would still be felt in the General 
Assembly through iis intluence over alligned countries. Most importantly, 
suspending the vote of a permanent member of the Security Council could 
lead to its withdrawl from the UN resulting in its total collapse. Such a 
action does not place money in the UN coffers and solve the final problem. 
A second and more promosing recommendation is to require all 
members to contribute to a separate Peace-keeping fund each year w hether 
or not peace-keeping operations are then in progress. This plan has many 
advantages. Foremost among these is that it helps remove the problem of 
financing peace-keeping from the political arena. In the past vshencver a 
country has refused to pay peace-keeping costs, the contributions have 
been for a force to which it was politically opposed. This recommendation 
would preclude such dilticulties by collecting funds for the force before 
the particular dispute arose. It also uould create a reserve which would be 
immediately available for the financing of operations. Thus avoiding the 
time lag involved in accumulating the funds as the need arises. Finally the 
system would allow for a large monetary reserve upon which interest could 
be accumulating, thus furtlier strengdiening the UN financial position while 
it is true that some states may be reluctant to follow this recommendation 
because it would give the UN too much power and while it is also true 
that there is some risk of the General Assembly becoming irresponsible in 
setting up peace-keeping forces, these drawbacks are outweighed by the 
advantages such a recommendation. 
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A third alternative is to develop a system of weighted voiing on 
budgetary matters. A very large portion of the controversy centers around 
how expenses are apportioned among the member states. Large countries 
often find themselves carrying the largest share of the expenses but still 
having only an equal voice with smaller, poor countries. Apportionment 
has traditionally been based on ability to pay and is tried closel\ to a 
country's gross national product. Hence, large countries are forced to 
support what they often consider to be rash decisions of nations who 
furnish little support. A weighted voting system should not have the effect 
of putting the veto power into the General Assembly. Voting weiglit need 
not be exactly proportional to economic power. 
Finally, it must be emphasized that such a weighted system should 
only be used when voting on financial matters. If weighted properly, it 
would not give ultimate control of the General Assembly to the larger 
states or upset the balance of power such a solution is ofcourse not without 
difficulties. Poorer countries with undoubtedly be extremely reluctant to 
give up even a small part of their power in the General Assembly. Further, 
this alternative would require an amendment to the Charter wiiich is 
certainly no easy task. 
The final suggestion may be useful in solving the immediate problem 
is that the world opinion must be focused against the recalcitrant states. 
The news media should be employed to inform the public that political 
nuance are being used to avoid financial responsibilities and this avoidance 
is a direct threat to everyone's and security. 
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FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 1980s AND WAYS AHEAD 
The total annual costs of all UN related activities amouni to a 
fraction of one percent of the member's military budget.' This mighi show 
how little money we are spending on peace and security matters. I'ntil the 
UN undertook extensive peace-keeping operations, the budget never really 
became an issue in the Organization's debates. The major problem, 
ofcourse, arose over the issue of peace-keeping. In the early i960s a 
financial crisis threatened the continued existence of the Organization. 
Since then, the Organization has been in a precarious financial crisis, and 
in 1986 it became greater as a result of unilateral actions in the US 
Congress proposing drasting reductions in US budget contributions. This 
problem is clearly less of a financial and more of a political nature, it is 
above all a question of the member countrie's attitude to the UN itself. 
The budget of entire UN system (i.e., the UN, plus the Specialized 
Agencies as well as programmes sponsored by the General Assembly) in 
1996 was roughly about $10 billion a year.- About one-third of this is 
funded through mandatory assessments from states which are members o f 
the various organizations comprising the system. The other two-thirds 
come from voluntary contributions. Twenty states pay almost four fifth of 
the total budget of the UN system. These countries are the US. Japan, 
Germany, Italy, Canada, the UK, the Russian federation, France, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Finland, Spain, Libya and Austria. The US, 
1. A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations Principles and Issues. 
(New Jersy: Prentice Hall International, 1988), P.91. 
2. Image & Reality (New York, United Nations, 1996), P17. 
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Germany and Japan pay almost 30 percent of the total budget.' 
In terms of order of the amounts contributed by the states to the 
UN, it is clear that a small proportion of the membership pays a large 
percentage of the expenses. But when the states are ranked in terms of 
other criteria, a new picture emerges. In terms of percapita contributions, 
six small countries Qatar, Brunei, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Iceland and 
Bahrain enter the ranks of the top 20. Norway, Denmark and Sweden 
become the top three, the Federal Republic of Germany and the US drop 
to 15th and 16th position while Japan, the second highest cash contributor 
to the UN system, does not figure in the list at all. 
When countries are ranked in terms of their contribution as a 
percentage of gross national income, 17 new countries appear on the list. 
Judged by all these criteria, only three contributors- Norway. Denmark and 
Sweden are among the top 20 contributors.'* 
The present financial position of the UN is precarious, over the 
years, the UN budget has increased to $ 1600 million by 1984-85 and for 
the biennium 1992-93 more than $ 2 billion. Its working capital (reserve) 
fund has been kept relatively low at $100 millions. This has created 
serious cash flow problems. The Secretary General was obliged to suspend 
or cutdown several programmes in 1986 and again in 1987. By December 
1987, there were no funds left to even disburse the salaries of all UN 
employees in January 1988. The US then doled out a sum of $90 million 
to enable the Secretary General to do the needful. This kind of precarious 
3. Rumki Basu. The United Nations Structure and Functions of an 
International Organization. (New Delhi, Sterling Publishers. 1996), 
P. 173. 
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88 
Sadly, the financial crisis was no longer considered as a matter of great 
concern among the majority of the member states. This is a ver) poor 
reflection on the commitment of these states to the UN. 
The UN fmds itself in the present financial straitjackei partly because 
of the accumulation of huge arrears of payment, and also because of late 
payments by most of the member states. Another important reason is the 
increasing reliance, over the years, on voluntary contributions which are 
volatile, uncertain and unpredictable. A sudden decline in voluntary 
contributions results in a large scale retrenchment of their personnel and 
activities. And this trauma is administered at regular intervals. This leaves 
the Organization truncated, demoralised and uncertain about its future. 
As of 31 January 1995. total arrears of payment of contributions to 
the assessed budget of the UN were $3.6 billion of which SI .4 billion was 
against the regular budget and $2.2 billion against the peace-keeping 
budget. The most disturbing part of the arrears picture was that out of the 
total arrears of $3.6 billion, as much as $ 2.5 billion or 70 percent were 
due from 5 top debtors. The largest amount being by the US.^  
The arrears are of two types. The first from a large number of very 
poor member countries which are unable to pay, because of dieir precarious 
ways and means and whose cumulative defaults of payment constitute a 
5. Muchkund Dubey, Financing tlie United Nations in M.S. Raj an (Ed.), 
UN at Fifty and Beyond. (New Delhi, Indian Society of International 
Law, 1995), P. 266. 
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very small part of the total arrears, and the second, from a handful of top 
contributors which are capable of making payment but are withholding 
their contributions as a standing blackmail against the UN. Among the top 
contributors, the US is the biggest defaulter and also the most persistent 
blackmailer. These top contributors deliberately hold back their dues to 
compel the UN to reduce their sizes, to adjust their agenda and alter the 
thrusts of their activities in order to receive payment of their dues. And 
since a part of the dues is permanently held back, the pressure on the UN 
is to restructure its agenda and activities. 
To buttress their position in favour of downsizing the UN. the major 
contributors, their governments, their intellectuals and their media carry 
out a concerted campaign against and perpetuate all kinds of m\ihs and 
distortions about the UN. One of such distortions is the so-called high and 
excessive cost of the organization draining billions of dollars from the tax 
payers of the de\eloped countries. In this connection there are frequent 
references to the bloated budget of the UN. The reality. ho\\e\er. is 
different, which is brought out by the following facts and figures. 
a) The estimated total worldwide cost of the UN system (excluding 
the IMF. World Bank and IFAD average $10.5 billion per annum 
during the biennium 1992/93. This included not only operating 
cost but also all development assistance funds and programmes, 
all peace-keeping and all the humanitarian emergency relief for 
the whole world. 
b) $10.5 billion represents under $2 per capita for the whole of 
mankind, at a time when the world spends about $150 per capita 
on military expenditure. S10.5 billion was only 0.0005 percent 
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of the world GNP in 1992. 
c) The regular assessed UN budget was $1.06 billion in 1994, The 
total UN budget (including contributions to peace-keeping and 
voluntary contribution for humanitarian assistance) is currently 
$4.5 billion. This budget is less than the combined annual cost 
of the police and fire department of the New York city. It is a 
strange irony that the same level of resources should he made 
available for global fire fighting and policing as for the police 
and fire department of a single ciiy in the US.'' 
The regular budget of the UN and those of the UN Specialized 
Agencies are finance on the basis of assessments related to a set of criteria 
laid down by the legislative bodies of these organizations. As regard the 
UN budget. Article 17.2 of the Charter provides. The expenses of the 
Organization shall be borne by the members as appropriated by the General 
Assembly J 
Under this provision of the Charter, the General Assembly assesses 
for each member stale the proportion of the expenses of the UN to be paid 
by it. The assessment is derived from the capacity to pay which is 
determined on the basis of usual economic indicators, including population, 
national income etc. The assessment are expressed in percentage terms 
which add up to the total UN budget. A ceiling of 25 percent limit was 
set. At present only the US reaches that limit and a minimum percentage 
of 0.01 of the total budget is fixed for payment uniformly by a category 
6. Ibid., PP. 266-267. 
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of the lowest income members identified for this purpose. 
The highest ceiling for the US has been periodically coming down. 
It was a little under 50 percent when the UN was established. It came 
down to 33 percent in 1952. 30 percent in 1955 and 25 percent in 1972 
which is continuing till today. According to the criteria applied uniformly 
for determining the capacity to pay, the US should be paying 31 percent 
of the budget, instead of 25 percent.** 
Article 17.2 ensures that every member state would have participated 
in the discussion of the budget, including its own share, and that once the 
budget was approved by the Assembly, each member state becomes party 
to this decision, and is therefore, automatically obliged to pay the 
assessment approved for it. This is apart from the treaty obligation of 
every member state to pay its dues without any conditionality. 
In this perspective, no country pays more and no countr\ pays. 
less , each country pays according to its ability to pay calculated by 
applying on a uniform non-discriminatory basis, a set of universall) agreed 
criteria. The relative burden of the member states is equal which is the 
essence of the application of the democratic principle for determining 
shares for the payment of the total budget. The country which pays 0.01 
percent of the budget sacrifice as much as the one which pays 25 percent 
of the share. The latter country has, therefore no right by virtue of the 
payment of its share, unilaterally to lay down any conditionalities for 
payment. The country paying 0.01 percent, the lowest percentage, is 
entitled to equal participation in the governance of the UN. 
8. Dubey, n.5, P. 268. 
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There is no basis in the Charter for any member state lo withhold 
its dues on grounds that it dislikes any policy or administrative practice 
that has been adopted by a duly constituted organ of the UN. This is based 
on the same principle as that which enjoins that no tax payer can decline 
to pay his or her income tax, which has duly legislated, simply because 
he or she dislikes some policy of the government, if is that so, the revenues 
of country (or of the UN) would be in perpetual uncertainly indeed chaos. 
Article 19 of the UN Charter provides that a member in arrears shall have . 
no vote in the General Assembly if the amounts of its arrears equals or 
exceeds the amount of the contribution due from it for the preceding two 
years. The General Assembly may nevertheless, permit such a Member to 
vote, if it is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond 
the control of the Member.^ 
The US is clearly in default under Artile 19. The US also cannot 
get a reprieve under the last sentence of this Article, because its failure 
to pay is not due to conditions beyond its control. Such conditions arises 
only in the situation of acute economic difficulties. The US has never been 
in such a condition, as it has never claimed that the non-payment of its 
dues is due to the prevalence of such a condition. 
Therefore, there is every justification for the General Assembly to 
suspend the voting rights of the US. But this has never been done on 
account of pragmatic political considerations. Given the overwhelming 
military and economic clout of the US, it is very unlikely that any 
international organization will be able to function effectively without its 
full participation. Thus the UN is in real dilemma on account of the US 
9. Goodrich and others, n.7, P. 176. 
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delinquency. There can be no effective or orderly international system if. 
its most powerful member decides to default systematically on its tinancial 
obligations. 
The UN peace-keeping budget is also based on assessment, though 
the formula applied for making the assessment of the contributions is 
slightly different from that applied to the assessments for the regular 
budget. According to the formula approved by the Assembly in 1973. each 
of the five permanent members of the Security Council pay 22 ^ more than 
their share under the regular budget assessment criteria, a second group 
of countries pays the same as in the regular budget formula, a third group 
of countries pays one-fifth of its regular assessment and a fourth group, 
pays one-tenth.'" 
According to this formula, the US is to pay 31.7% of the peace-
keeping budget. The major contributors have defaulted on the paxment of 
their contributions to the peace-keeping budget also. They are also 
reluctant, among others, on financial grounds to permit the UN to take on 
too many peace-keeping operations. Ofcourse, there are political reasons 
too, the most important of them being the desire of the major military 
powers to act on their own without involving the UN or just getting the 
stamp of UN's approval for their acting on their own in situations of threat 
or breach of peace. As a combine result of both economic and political 
factors the UN is now reduced to a mere residual role in peace-keeping. 
And in the peace-keeping operations the UN is permitted to carry 
out, face uncertainly of resources and frequently run into problems. Owing 
to the arrears of the payment of the assessed shares, the countries 
10. Dubey, n.5, PP.269-270. 
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countributing troops have experienced up to 5 years of delay in the 
reimbursement of their costs. On September, 1994, UN owed Si billion 
to some 70 member states contributing troops and equipment." 
Another problem with the regular budget is its excessive dependence. 
on a handful of countries for sustaining the UN budget. Out of the total 
1994 regular budget amounting to $1,061.8 million, one state, that is the 
USA, paid 25% and 24 states paid 64.6%.^^ This concentration holds the 
UN hostage to the whims of a few nations and enables these nations to 
exercise undue influence over the affairs of the UN system. 
Yet another problem with the regular budget is that it has to be paid 
in dollars. Many smaller and less developed third world countries suffer 
from serious dollar shortage and are therefore obliged to default in the 
payment of their dues.'^ 
According to Article 18.2 of the Charter, "any decision of the General 
Assembly on substantive issues which include all financial matters is taken 
by a two- thirds majority of the members present and voting." This 
principle was scrupulously adhered to until the early 1980s when the 
major contributors started unfolding their designs on the budget. They 
wanted to arbitrarily freeze the budgets of the UN system or even to reduce 
them in real terms. They, therefore, sought to acquire a veto on the 
decision on the budget. They achieved this purpose in 1986 when the 
President of the Assembly made consensus statement to the effect that the 
11. Ibid., P.270. 
12. The Europa World Yearbook (England, Europa Publication. 1995), 
Vol.11, P.3. 
13. Dubey, n.5, P.270. 
14. Goodrich and others, n.7, P. 168. 
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Fifth Committee of the Assembly made all possible efforts with a view 
to establishing the broadest possible agreement on the budget. The US 
and other developed countries took it to mean the approval of the budget 
by consensus. Since then the UN budget and those of the Specialized 
Agencies have been approved by consensus, that is, under the veto power 
of the developed countries. As a consequence, all regular budgets of the 
UN system have remained more or less frozen for the last 11 years.'^ 
One of the most unfortunate developments in the UN financing has 
been the steady growth of voluntary contributions. The founders of the UN 
envisaged only one method of raising resources for the financing of the 
UN, and that was through assessed contributions. This was the only method 
consistent with the obligations of the member states under the UN Charter. 
The Charter, therefore, makes no provision for voluntary contributions. 
When the practice of voluntary contributions was introduced, it was 
meant only to finance technical assistance activities. But by the late 1960s, 
this limitation was transgressed and voluntary financing was resorted to for 
financing other activities also. The situation has come to a pass where 
regular UN reports, seminars and inter-governmental meetings are also 
being financed through voluntary contributions. This has given the major 
contributors firm grip over the activities of the UN system. Toda\ by and 
large, the UN does what the member governments making major voluntary 
contributions want them to do. 
Till the early 1970s, there was only one principal source to which 
voluntary contributions for carrying out development assistance activities 
were made, and that was the UNDP and its predecessors in various forms. 
15. Dubey, n.5, P.271. 
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There were, ofcourse, a few significant exceptions. Refugee assistance and 
relief activities carried out by the UN were also, financed through \oluntary 
contributions. 
Inspite of these important exceptions the fact remained that voluntary 
contributions for development assistance activities of the UN were 
channelled mainly through the UNDP. UNDP was regarded as the central 
body of the UN system to provide resources for technical assistance. All 
Specialized Agencies, with the exception of WHO which started with 
resources of its own earmarked for fmancing technical assistances activities. 
looked up to the UNDP for finding resources for their technical assistance 
programmes. 
The extraordinary expansion in the budget of the UN system based 
on voluntary contributions and the proliferation of funds financed b} each 
contributors, has had very adverse effect for the UN system. Firstly, it 
distorts the development priorities of the recipient governments, and even 
those laid down by intergovernmental bodies. It has also led to frequent 
shifts in priorities depending upon the priorities prevalent in donor 
countries and the ideas emanating from the think tanks in these countries. 
We have thus seen during the last two decades the so-called global priorities 
shifting from poverty alleviation to human development, and so on. Added 
to these priorities have been such other objectives as growth in GNP. ' 
meeting basic needs, involvement of the people in the process of 
development, reducing unemployment, population management and removal 
of gender bias. Thus, today the UN have a vast menu of global priorities 
to choose from which can justify any activity they intend to take up. 
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Secondly, the voluntary basis of financing UN activities has 
introduced uncertainty and unpredicla-bility in the UN development 
assistance programmes. It has made it very difficult to plan for the future 
on any assured basis. The effectiveness of the programmes has been 
adversely affected and countries the confidence of member countries in the 
UN has been undermined. 
Thirdly, voluntary funding has given tremendous fillip to 
conditionalities. Conditionalities are imposed not only for determining 
priorities, but also for getting the maximum out of the \oluntary 
contributions made in terms of export of personnel and equipment. In a 
give and take table which was informally circulating in the UNDP in the 
early 1970s, for every dollar paid as voluntary contribution, the UK and 
France were getting back close to a dollar and half and the USA about 95 
cents. Channeling UN assistance in the priority areas of their choice has 
also helped major donor countries to prepare the ground for large scale 
export or goods and services to the recipient countries and tor the 
penetration of their multinationals into these countries. 
Fourthly, voluntary funding has undermined the democratic process 
of decision making in the UN. The major donor countries by \ irtue of 
their larger contributions exercise dominant influence over this process. 
Fifthly, voluntary funding has been an important factor introducing donor 
recipient relationship in the UN. In the regular budget, there is no donor 
and recipient. Every member country pays according to its capacity to pay 
based on formula uniformally applicable to all. But in voluntary funding, 
some contribute more and some contribute less. Some countries ostensibly 
do not get back anything out of their contributions, while other countries 
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pay very little but receive most of the funds as recipients of UN technical 
assistance. This donor recipient syndrome has resulted in the dilution of 
the basic UN principle of the sovereign equality of all its members . it 
has also lowered the very quality of relations among nations. 
The most unfortunate part is that this donor recipient syndromes 
engendered by the voluntary funding of the UN activities has been 
transported to the regular budgets of the UN system. Where a group of 
countries are claiming that they have the right unilaterally to determine the 
priorities of the activities of the UN system by virtue of their being the 
larger contributors to the UN regular budget. 
Sixthly, the rapid increase in the component of the UN budget 
financed through voluntary contributions has been a major factor prexenting 
the desired growth in its regular budgets. This phenomenon has had the 
effect of diluting the concept of financing the UN as a matter of treaty 
obligation. 
Finally, when the UN resorted to voluntary contributions for 
financing its activities, the expectation was that this will help in mobilising 
additional resources. But things have not worked out that wa). It is a 
matter of speculation whether in the absence of voluntary contributions. 
the UN would have been able to raise the present level of its budgetary 
resources from assessments from Member states. However, the fact remains 
that even with voluntary contributions, the over-all availability of resources 
has remained very meagre in relation to the expanding needs of the 
international community for such resources, tliat there have been prolonged 
and frequent periods of stagnation in the levels of resources mobilised 
through voluntary contributions and that the contributions has tluciuated 
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very widely."' 
In view of the chronic nature of the resources constraint of the UN 
and the uncertainty surrounding the availability of resources, suggestions 
have been made from time to time to tap autonomous and predictable 
sources of financing. The person who carried out a veritable campaign for 
several years for raising such resources for the UN financing was Frof. Jan 
Timbergen, the first Nobel Laureat in Economics and the chairman of the 
UN committee for development planning for the best part of the late sixties 
and early seventies. His favourite scheme was international taxation on the 
consumption of luxury goods. He got a recommendation to this effect 
which has included in successive reports of the committee on development 
planning. In 1980, in a conference in Dubrovnik, he presented a paper 
giving the economic rationale for instituting a system of international 
taxation to raise resources for multilateral orgainzation. His basic reasoning 
was the same as has been given in justification of national taxation, that 
is, the welfare argument and the inevitability of carrying out activities on 
behalf of the community (in the present context the community of nations) 
as a whole. 
The proposals advanced for raising new resources for the UN on a 
stable and assured basis are either in the form of international taxation or 
incomes derived from the global commons like the sea, space, biosphere 
etc. Some of the proposals, if implemented, would, apart from raising 
incomes for UN organizations, have other in important positive effects like 
putting a measure of restraint on the exploitation of natural resources, 
moderating large scale currency speculations or in the case of the Tobin 
16. Ibid., PP.271-275. 
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Tax, discouraging arms transfer etc. The following is a brief listing of 
some of the major proposals. 
(a) Tobin Tax- Explaining his proposal for a tax on currency 
speculations. Prof. Tobin has stated (1994 Human Development 
report. UNDP) thai the capital flows needed to achieve an 
efficient allocation of world savings are today a miniscule fraction 
of the world-wide transactions in currency markets (1 trillion per 
day). The bulk of these transactions are speculations and 
arbitrages, seeking to make quick money on exchange rate 
fluctuations. They contribute little to rational long term 
investment allocations. An irrevocable unique world currency 
which can escape such a turbulence is decades away. So the 
second best solution is to tax speculations based on fluctuations 
in currency exchange rates. The revenue potential is $ 1.5 trillion' 
per year for a 0.5% tax. The proceeds should be devoted to 
international purpose and be placed at the disposal of 
international institutions. A 0.5% tax is equivalent to a 4% 
difference in annual interest rates on three-month bills, a 
considerable deterrence to persons contemplating a quick round 
trip to another currency. It will, however, be too small to deter 
commodity trade or serious international movements. 
(b) A tax on the international sale of designated weapons. 
(c) Pollution tax: A global carbon tax or tax on sale of fossil fuels. 
It is estimated that a $ 5 per barrel tax on oil would yield $100 
billion per year. 
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(d) Travel tax: Agreement on such a tax could be reached in the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) this could take 
the form of a flat tax on all air travellers in selected sectors. The 
justification would be that air travel depends on international 
regulations, as well as peace and stability, which the UN is 
supposed to ensure. It held that a flat of charge of S 5 per 
passenger covering 300 million travellers every years will fetch 
S 1.5 billion annually. 
(e) Making available a part of the proceeds derived from the mining 
of the sea-bed. 
(f) A tax on international trade. 
(g) A tax for parking geo-stationary satellites. 
(h) A tax for using the electromagnatic spectrum. 
(i) Charges on marine ocean transport. 
(j) Charges for fishing rights in the high seas. 
(k) Charges on maritime dumping of wastes. 
(1) Making available to the UN the proceeds from one day's scale 
of stamps by tlie world's post offices every year. 
(m) A tax on the day's telecommunication every year.'^ 
Many of these proposals are viable and workable. What is lacking 
is the political will of the member states of the UN to reach agreement on 
one or more of these proposals and implement them. Until now, the 
governments of the major developed countries are not prepared to accept 
17. Ibid., PP.275-277, Bannett, n . l , PP.97-98, Basu, n.2. pp. 182-83. 
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any of these proposals because the main burden of payment will tall on 
them and also because they do not want the UN to be an autonomous 
organization with stable source of financing. 
In their bid to continue to exercise control over the Organization, 
they want it to go on living from hand to mouth. Developing countries on 
their part have no unified position on any of these proposals. In any case, 
they do not want to confront the major powers on this issue. 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the UN, a number of 
studies on the finances of the UN were undertaken and suggestions were 
made for improving the financial position of the UN. Some of the studies. 
and reports were officially sponsored by the UN Secretary General and 
duly submitted to the General Assembly. However, even the modest 
proposals made in these reports have not been given due consideraiicm. ill 
now, let alone being accepted. Therefore, prospects for impro\ ing the 
financial position of the UN in the near future do not appear to be 
promising. 
Muchkund Dubey, the former foreign Secretary of India has made 
following suggestions for overcoming the present financial crisis of the 
UN.'« 
(A) The problem of late payments and arrears 
a) Interest should be charged on late payments by member states 
except the low income countries facing genuine difficulties in 
making payments. 
b) Arrears due from this group of countries should be liquidated by 
18. Dubey, n.5. PP.277-280. 
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onetime proportional increase in the assessments of the other 
member states. 
c) The problem of deliberate defaulting cannot be ignored. Ihe ICJ 
should move to pronounce on the illegality or otherwise, in terms 
of Article 19 of the Charter, of deliberate non-payment of dues 
and on the sanctions that can be applied against the defaulting 
state under the Charter. (B) Concentration of assessed 
contribution: 
The present excessively high ceiling (25%) of contribution by any 
single member state should be reduced to not more than 10 to 12.5^c. 
Other member states, particularly the middle economic powers which will 
include several developing countries should be prepared to increase their 
own contributions to compensate for the loss of revenues on account of the 
lowering of the ceiling. 
(C) Assessed Contributions: 
a) The primacy of the regular budgets of the organization of the UN 
system should be reaffirmed. These Organizations should rely 
mainly on tlieir regular budgets for financing their activities. All 
the operational and administrative costs of these organizations 
should be financed from their regular budgets. 
b) All peace-keeping operations should continue to be financed on 
the basis of special assessments. 
(D) Voluntary Contributions: 
a) Urgent and decisive steps should be taken towards reversing the 
104 
growing dependent of the UN on extra-budgetary sources of 
financing. The system of voluntary funding should be phased out 
within a time-bound framework. 
b) As an interim measure all administrative and management costs 
of operating UN's development assistance programmes should be 
moved to financing by assessment. 
c) As a part of phasing out, a minimum of 25 % of the total budget 
for operational activities should be moved to the assessed portion 
of the overall budget. 
(E) New aulonomous sources of financing: 
An expert group may examine the various proposals for pro\iding 
to the UN access to autonomous sources of financing and recommend the 
most equitable, feasible and desirable proposals in order of intense 
preference. The group should also work out in detail the modalities of 
implementing the recommended proposals and negotiations should 
commence on reaching an agreement on one or more of these proposals. 
immediately after the completion of the work of the expert group. 
(F) Resources for Peace-keeping: 
a) Arrears on peace-keeping assessments should be cleared on an 
urgent basis. 
b) Decisions should be taken urgently on the various proposals 
made by the Secretary General in his report Agenda for Peace 
for resolving the present difficulties in financing the peace-
keeping operations of the UN. 
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c) In particular, this proposal to establish a reserve fund tor pre-
assessment. Starl-up of peace-keeping operations should be 
accepted and urgently acted upon. 
(G) Currency of payment of financial contributions to the UN. 
All transactions of the UN system, either from the assessed or 
voluntary contributions, should be carried out, not in dollars as at present, 
but in special drawing rights or any other unit of account based on a basket 
of currencies. 
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(^^^<zftt&t - 5 
ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION 
The financial crisis of the UN is not the expression of a struggle • 
over the Organization's existence. AH states have accepted its presence. 
The struggle is being waged between the strict interpreters of the Charter 
and those who wish to interpret it more liberally, those who wish to 
maintain the UN as a static conference machinery , and those who wish 
to give it increasing strength and executive authority. Viewed in this light, 
the financial crisis of the UN does not indicate that the Organization has 
fallen into political collapse, but rather that the membership has not yet 
been willing to ratify and sustain its rise to a higher plane of evolutionary 
development. 
However, one cannot deny the existence of a major crisis. But the • 
crisis is more constitutional and political than financial. At its heart is not 
so much the problem of economic incapacity to pay the rising costs, but 
of unwillingness to pay for politically controversial operations. The overall 
contributions of membership have risen from $20 million in 1946. to S50 
million in 1960 and $850 million in 1986, the revised assessment of 
member states for the UN regular budget in 1996 was $1.3 billion. This 
does not include the peace-keeping budget of $3.2 billion (in 1995). Neither 
does it include the budget of the Specialized Agencies which is around 
$5.5 billion (not including IBRD, IMF & IFAD, which spent around $4.6 
billion). Thus, excluding the Bretlon Woods institutions, the entire UN 
system presently spends a sum of $10 billion a year.' For one, the impact 
of inflation alone is responsible for a 70 percent increase over the last ten 
1. Image & Reality (New York: United Nations, 1996), P. 17. 
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years, Second, and more importantly, the growing interdependence of the 
world has led to the new challenges for the UN, the need for more 
finances for programmes relating to disaster relief, energy, food, 
environment, outerspace, refugee, seabeds and ocean floors and 
transnational corporations. But when considered in a broader context, 
these amounts are very small. National income and national budgets have 
also arisen almost everywhere. Nations have called on the UN to assume 
increasingly greater responsibilities. In that sense, the rising costs indicate 
the Organization's growing vitality. Moreover, nations save money because 
the UN exists. A host country like the US absorbs a substantial sum as 
feedback into its economy because it houses the UN. Despite these, it is 
significant that the budget for a single year for the New York city police 
department is higher than that of a one year UN budget. Again, the world 
community spends more money on armaments every hour of the day than 
the sum of the UN budget reserved for two years. The cost of UN peace-
keeping in 1996 was 0.2 percent of world military spending (presently 
estimated at $767 billion). If the military spending of a single year is 
given to the UN system it will survive for 76 years.-
Of all the activities of the UN, those included under the regular 
budget have been the least controversial- or were until 1963. when France 
refused to pay for principal and interest on UN bonds and the Soviet bloc 
countries not only followed suit but also refused to pay for certain minor 
peace-keeping operations that heretofore had been financed by through the 
regular budget without much difficulty. 
The most significant changes over the years have been the downward 
2. These statistics are taken from Image & Realitv (New York 1996) 
P.21. 
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adjustment of the US assessment percentage which has varied from more 
than 39 percent to a maximum ceiling of 25 percent in 1972 which has 
remained unchanged since. The erstwhile Soviet Union assessment has 
been increased by about the same amount, from 7.73 percent in 1946 to 
14.15 percent in 1954, and then after their disintegration into 15 stales its 
contribution reduced to 6.71 in 1994. 
Under the current 1996 scale, 170 out of 185 states were assessed 
of 0.01 percent or a total of 25 percent of the UN's regular budget and 
the top ten donors contribute more than 70 percent of the UN"s regular 
budget. 
There has been no major crisis over the regular budget. The heart 
of the tension lies in the area of peace-keeping. For the first time in 
history, an international organization has created and financed peace forces 
as a collective responsibility of the world community. The UNEF and 
ONUC during 1950s and 1960s have been the most controversial of these. 
They have raised opposition both on financial and political grounds. The 
problem of relative capacity to pay has pitted the developed countries 
against the large majority of economically less developed countries. The 
conflict between them has resulted in a succession of rebate formulas 
under which the richer countries have made voluntary contributions to 
make up the deficits created by the reductions granted the poorer ones. 
While each assessment since 1956 has been adhoc, and no formula was 
ever institutionalized, these rebate formulas in effect have come close to 
establishing special assessment scales for UNEF and ONUC. 
By far the most serious problem has been posed by the political 
attitude of the strict interpreters toward the peace-keeping functions. They 
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wish to deny the peace-keeping role to the UN, while the liberals desire 
to extend it. The financial crisis over UNEF and ONUC is first and 
foremost a political crisis over the proper role of these two peace-keeping • 
forces. Only secondarily it is a crisis over money. Both liberals and strict 
interpreters have responded to specific cases in terms of national interest, 
rather than abstract principle. From the US point of view. UN HP and 
ONUC sealed off a no man's land in the cold war from a possible East-
West military confrontation and reduced the likelihood of unilateral 
intervention by the Soviet Union. The former Soviet Union reasoned in the 
same manner and therefore arrived at opposite conclusions. From its point 
of view, UNEF and ONUC prevented Soviet bridgeheads in the Middle 
East and Africa. Since, in the latter case, a bridgehead had already been 
established and had to be liquidated under UN pressure, its opposition to 
ONUC took a more active form. 
While it is true in principle that the US has been fundamentally 
committed to the basic purposes of the UN Charter, and the earstwhile 
Soviet Union, as a superpower, has been deeply suspicious of the 
Organization, the two superpowers have tended to react to the Suez and 
Congo peace-keeping challenges primarily in terms of their own national 
interests. The only general difference that might be postulated is the US 
tendency, when there is a choice between genuine UN neutralization and 
no UN action, to prefer the former and for the Soviet Union to prefer the 
latter. But this difference too is probably the result of the specific 
experiences of the two superpowers. 
The purely fiscal factor has assumed far greater importance in the 
attitudes of most of the middle and smaller powers. On the one hand, the 
110 
fear that it could happen here . has led to support for the peace forces. 
On the other hand, the cost of these extraordinary expenses has militated 
in the opposite direction. The interaction between these two contlicting 
pressures has led to the admixture of political support and tinancial 
delinquency that has marked the behaviour of so many of these member 
states. 
To sum up. the positions of the US, the United Kingdom, and the 
Soviet Union have had relatively little to do with finances per se. Neither 
has the policy of France, which accepted and helped pay for UNIZF. but 
not for ONUC. In the case of China and the bulk of the middle and 
smaller powers, money played a far larger, in some instances. c\en a 
decisive role. In terms of national income, more than one-third of the 
member states have borne a heavier burden than the two superpowers. 
Hence, while the financial crisis of UNEF and ONUC is caused primarily 
by the political attitudes of the few, it has deepened considerably through 
the financial limitations of the many. 
In its two major attempts to surmount the crisis, the Assembly has 
tended to embrace the liberal position. The bond issue which - at least in 
a single instance - endowed the Organization with major borrowing powers 
was an important milestone in the evolution of the UN. Significantly 
enough, the bonds were purchased not only by liberals, but also by a 
considerable number of middle-of-the-roaders. Similarly, the Assembly's 
request for an Advisory Opinion from the ICJ was in essence an invitation 
to the Court to declare itself on the nature of the Organization. The 
majority opinion and its acceptance by the Assembly were clear 
vindications of the liberal position and acknowledged legally tlie Assembly's 
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unlimited fiscal authority. Yet neither the bond issue nor the Advisory 
Opinion provided a solution. The former was a stop-gap emergence device. 
and the latter did not move the majority of delinquent states to change their 
policies. Nor .vas the problem resolved by the two Working Groups or by 
the Special Session of the Assembly in 1963. The total UN debt by the 
end of 1963 approached the $140 million mark. The political crisis 
continued unabated, with France and the Soviet bloc continuing their 
refusal to pay. At the heart of this crisis was the fact of international life 
that no power, least of all a great power, would adopt, or pay for. a policy 
that it considered inimical to its national interest. 
In the economic and social activities of the UN, the dialogue between 
liberals and strict interpreters has taken a somewhat different form. The 
political division has fallen less along East-West lines than between ihe 
industrialized and the developing countries. Unlike peace and security 
operations, which have been unpredictable and scattered, the economic and 
social activities of the UN have been stable and long-term commitments. 
The issue has not been whether they should exist but how rapidh they 
should grow. 
If the overall patterns of financing the peace-keeping are compared 
with the economic and social operations of the UN, it seems paradoxical' 
that the latter, on which there exists almost universal agreement on 
principle, should be funded primarily by voluntary contributions, while the 
former, which has divided the Organization against itself, has been financed 
primarily through compulsory assessments. 
There is yet another connection between the peace-keeping 
operations and the economic and social programmes. The implication of 
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the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ was clearly that the Assembly had the 
power to make legally binding decisions in the financial field. The small 
minority, who were the most powerful members of the UN paid the lion's. 
share of UN asssessments while the voting majorit} had the authority to 
control the UN budget. So, the economically less developed nations, in the 
UN use the precedent of the Opinion to vote large funds for economic and 
social developments as legally binding assessments on the membership. 
In the 1980s also the UN faced the most serious financial crisis in 
its history, threatening not only its immediate solvency, but also, as many 
feared, its long terms viability, because of unilateral decision of the US 
Congress through Kassebaum Amendment, which dictated that unless the 
UN replaced the one-state one vote requirement on budgetary questions 
with weighted voting based on the size of a member's assessed contribution, , 
the US would reduce its contribution from 25 percent to 20 percent of 
regular budget. 
With the unilateral decision of US. the Assembly created a Special 
Group of 18 experts which is later called the GrOup of High Level 
Intergovern-mental Experts , in February 1986 to seek long term solution 
to the problem. In August 18, 1986, this group produced its 40 page 
report (A/41/49), to the Secretary General, Javier Perez de Cuellar. 
formulated 71 recommendations which covered personnel measures. 
secretarial structure, monitoring budget and implementation procedures 
and a number of economy measures to reduce expenditure. 
The General Assembly members approved these recommendation; 
in its 1986 session. As a result of the Assembly action on the Grou{ 
Report, states have agreed to act by consensus on important budget issue; 
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which previously have proved divisive. But this Group Report was also not 
able to evolve a long term solution of financial problem which is acceptable 
to all UN members. So, the institutional reform or restructuring initiated 
by the Secretary Genearl could not help the situation, unless the necessary 
political will among those whose cooperation and support is essential to 
make use of the machinery in the desired direction is forthcoming. As such 
the vital change needed is not in regard to institutional arrangements but 
attitudinal ones, on the part of member states. This holds good noi only 
for the US and other major powers but the middle and smaller powers too. 
Structural changes will not make much difference. What is needed is a 
convergence of views and an evolving of a consensus on the role of the 
UN on what it should do and what it should not do. 
It is hoped that the period of uncertainty that engulfed the future of 
the UN system since the mid- 1980s will prove to be a turning point for 
the policies that member state have pursued, especiallv, since the mid 
1970s. It is clear that the countries of the industralized North, particularly 
the US, have not been fair in attacking the UN and paralysing its 
functioning in the economic and social fields. On the other hand, the 
developing countries of the South could easily be accused of misusing the 
UN system. The South can also be accused of acting on the belief that 
its majority and thereby its vast voting strengih is the ultimate weapi)n with 
which to mould the international system to its liking. 
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